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ABSTRACT

This study attempts to illuminate the relationship between Shah Mohammed
Reza Pahlavi and Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, in the context of Shi'i
history. The Boulding model serves as the major theoretical framework.
It postulates three kinds of human relationships based on differing
organizing principles, namely, the exchange system, the integrative
system, and the threat system.
Established through a military coup d'etat in 1921 by Reza Khan (the
father of Moahammed Reza Pahlavi) the threat system seemed to dominate
Iran throughout the Pahlavi rule which ended in 1979. Under this kind
of social organization, distance and legitimacy emerge as major
variables. Activities, writings, and speeches of major public figures
are employed to demonstrate the disparity between intent and outcome of
the Shah's policies, and between world views and subsequent actions of
the Shah and Khomeini.
The theoretical offerings of Wallace and Klapp, add to the Boulding
model by postulating how societies reflect distress and disintegration,
inherent to any threat system, and how they handle these conditions.
Wallace concentrates on "revitalization movements" which occur within
groups or societies suffering from threatened self-identity and involve
re-definition in opposition to other groups. Klapp explores the role of
villain images, facilitating the "closing of the system."
Together these themes form the background for an analysis of Shi'ism in
Iran as an integrative system with a history of opposition to the ruling
group, and as apparent contemporary solution for many Iranians. They
further permit insight into the nature of the regime of Mohammed Reza
Pahlavi, and into the role of Ayatollah Khomeini as voice of the
opposition, charismatic leader, and as "prince" who legitimates his own
threat system.

SHAH MOHAMMED REZA PAHLAVI AND AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI
IN LIGHT OF SHI'I HISTORY

INTRODUCTION

HE HAS LEFT
large photos of a gaunt, elongated face, its
controlled features so bent on showing neither
anxiety nor defeat that it no longer expresses
anything at all....
HE HAS RETURNED
A severe patriarchal face that has no intention of
expressing anything at all fills the rest of the
page. (And between that departure and that return,
what heights of emotion and fervor, rage and terror,
how many conflagrations!) (Kapuscinski 1985, 3).
To some of the scholars studying Iranian history, the recent
revolution in Iran was an extreme reaction to social atomization, a
byproduct of rapid change.

Islam constituted a fallback ideology to

capture the alienated, the disoriented, and the angry (Dekmajian in
Curtis 1981, 40).

To others, the revolution represented triumph over

decades of "total repression” and over the "complete absence of rights"
(Katouzian 1981, 332).

"A nation trampled by despotism, degraded,

forced into the role of an object, seeks shelter, seeks a place where it
can dig itself in, wall itself off, be itself" (Kapuscinski 1985, 113).
It is an attempt to preserve its separate identity and to regain
security.

"But a whole nation cannot emigrate, so it undertakes a

migration in time rather than space" (Kapuscinski 1985, 113).

Migration

in time may involve self-definition in opposition to other groups, in
terms of "what we are not."

In its extreme form, this presentation of a

united front expresses itself in schism, revolution and war.

Symbols,

rituals and institutions, rooted in commonly shared values, beliefs,
expectations and anxieties perpetuate submission to the group--which
becomes the magna mater, and gives renewed meaning and security to life.

2

Meaning is a way of ordering.
relations.

It lends context to information and to

Thus, it forms the basis for identity, and identification,

and consequently, for autonomy.

As Miller observes, societies make

their most important adjustments to the meaning, rather than the rate of
incoming information.

If the rate alone seems to threaten identity--it

is a sign "that the system is breaking down."

One exception, however,

is monetary information--where changes in flows activate adjustment
processes.

Thus, profound social changes may follow sudden increase in

wealth such as oil producing countries experienced in the 1970s (Miller
1978, 833-834).

Confronted with drastic change in all spheres of life,

over a relatively short period of time, the Iranian people faced major
adjustments.

Within the context of instability, rooted in Iranian

history, this process threatened their separate identity.

In this

sense, intense embrace of Shi'ism, to the exclusion of other solutions,
eliminated a multitude of behavioral elements, basic to change, and
increased predictability of events.^
At the same time, however, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi seemingly
offered his own kind of predictability.

For instance, he apparently

tried to facilitate social cohesion, and establish legitimacy, through
rituals, such as the formal coronation ceremony in 1967, and the
splendid Persepolis ceremony celebrating his 30 year rule in 1971, among
others.

(At both occasions he asserted pre-Islamic, Aryan roots, to the

horror to Iran's devout Shi'is.)

In addition, he dramatically

strenghtened the armed forces, instituted a one-party system, in the
name of democracy, and at least tolerated, if not encouraged, SAVAK to
scrutinize "potential troublespots," such as labour unions, peasant
organizations, student groups, guilds, and even mosques, instilling

pervasive fear of consequences for criticizing or disagreeing with the
regime.

In concert with these strategies, the Shah pursued rapid

modernization for Iran, modeled after the West.

Accordingly, favoring

progressive modernization policies, and protecting Western political and
economic interests in the region of the Persian Gulf, the West, and
particularly the United States, supported the Shah.

Some observers say

support dwindled under the Carter Administration, related to American
demands for human rights in Iran, and to restricted availability of
American military equipment for Iran (Sullivan 1981, Preece 1979).
Nevertheless, the bulk of the Iranian people came to perceive the Shah
as "puppet” of the United States. They viewed the Shah and the United
States as threat to their autonomy, sovereignty, and even to their life.
In reaction, the Iranians projected their wrath onto those two major
enemies.

Seemingly, they provided the common focus formerly

lacking--Shi'ism provided the organizational force--a complex
accumulation of events provided the climate ripe for revolution.

The

rituals, beliefs, and practices of Shi*ism, according to historical
precedent, lent intensity and pacing to the "closing of the system,"
returning the Iranian people to illusionary safety of a lost
paradise.
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Ayatollah Khomeini presided over the "closing" by

manipulating these rituals, beliefs, and practices on behalf of the
revolution.

He became the "charismatic leader," the Imam, of the

faithful by his connection (perceived by them) with some central feature
of their existence.
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This centrality, coupled with intensity,

constituted a powerful force.
With these notions in mind, and in an effort to learn how systems
operate, whether groups or societies, I will focus on the relationship

between the regime of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and Shi'ism in Iran, in

light of Shi'i history. Within this context, I consider the following
questions relevant:

What was the nature of the structures and dynamics

that gave rise to the Iranian revolution?

What were some of the crucial

variables and relationships that produced the explosive mixture?

How

did Shi'ism as integrative system with its historical role as "the party
in opposition to the regime in power" (Savory in Curtis 1981, 132), and
as revitalization movement, contribute to contemporary events?

In light

of established principles and practices of Shi'ism, what was the role of
Ayatollah Khomeini?

In general, these are the questions I will address

in my thesis, using the theoretical framework outlined below.

RELATIONSHIP TO THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE

Students of social change must address the social order, that is,
social organization.

Depending on their view of the world, or their

theoretical framework, they examine structures and processes from
differing perspectives.

For Durkheim, for example, change occurs with

societal growth and increasing population density.

Society

differentiates from a homogeneous mass into heterogeneous,
interdependent subunits.
force.

Differences between people serve as cohesive

Individual freedom slowly replaces tradition.

At the same time,

a common, underlying bond, the "collective conscience," is necessary for
preventing estrangement while serving as basis for cooperation and
exchange.

Conflict may ensue, however, when progress intersects with

religious beliefs and with strong collective sentiments.
unidirectional, continuous, evolutionary.

Change is
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For Marx, in contrast, change is the result of class struggle and
alienation, common to all property systems.

Alienation is an

intolerable, contradictory, and therefore, unstable condition, linked
solely to differential access to the means of production.

It will

ultimately result in the demise of the capitalist system.

Change is

inevitably and necessarily dialectical and revolutionary.

According to

Durkheim then, change may be seen as creation and growth, or, according
to Marx, as schism and radical rearrangement, and then growth.
To this extent, Boulding distinguishes between kinds of change.

He

contrasts "evolutionary, developmental change," to "revolutionary,
dialectical change" (1970).

On the evolutionary side, he uses the

bridge Spencer built, between processes in nature and processes in
social systems.

Accordingly, evolution is rooted in an ecological

relationship where "the values describing the processes are defined
inclusively of one another."

That is, "...

free individuals find

fulfillment in lawfull cooperation, while the laws of the cooperative
relationship free and individualize persons involved" (Hampden-Turner
1982, 210).

Or, on a more concrete level, hen, egg, hen follow each

other in evolutionary, not revolutionary, succession (Boulding 1970).
Thus, evolutionary processes either dovetail, or nest in each other.
Contradictions can arise, given certain changes in the environment;
they are not, however, inherent consequences of the inner dynamics of
the system.

Moreover, they tend to be of low intensity and shortlived.

The term dialectical can be traced from Plato, to Hegel, to Marx,
and beyond.

Boulding uses it in a "narrower, more Hegelian sense" than

does Marx to describe historical change, namely in terms of thesis,
antithesis, synthesis.

The original system entails its own

negation--because it is built on inherent contradiction.
one state to another involve conflict.

Swings from

While there are few examples of

dialectical processes in nature--we find them in historical patterns of
revolution and war.
In addition, Boulding postulates three kinds of human
relationships, based on differing organizing principles.

They are the

exchange system, the integrative system, and the threat system (1970).
These approximate Sorokin's classifications of contractual, familistic,
and compulsory relationships.

Exchange is a positive sum game where

through interaction, all parties may gain.

It is based on promises,

rather than threats, namely on "'the promises men live by'" (Scherman,
qtd.

in Boulding 1968, 232).

The integrative system relates to values,

to love, and to how institutions acquire respect and legitimacy.

Even

within its context, exchange is present, as, for example, in families or
integrative communities.

The threat system is a zero sum game where one

party gains at the expense of another.

The threat system dominates in

an "authoritarian state or in a military organization" (Boulding 1968,
233).

At the same time, both, the exchange and the integrative system

are also operative, and seemingly necessary--otherwise dictators and
generals would find their speeches superfluous. Only organizations
whose members identify with the purpose of the organization to some
degree can be relatively successful.

For example, the "...

ethical

appeal of Socialism is primarily to the integrative system" (Boulding
1968, 237).

All social organizations then, contain these three

relationships to a greater or lesser degree.

Their stability depends on

the relative proportion to which each organizer is present (Boulding
1968, 233).

Boulding defines social organizations as "role structures

with a communication network uniting the occupants of the roles."
Social organizations include people and artifacts "bound together by a
network of inputs and outputs of energy and information, or objects"
(Boulding 1970, 22).

From this perspective, business exchange, or

economic development follows evolutionary patterns --because all parties
stand to win--unless exchange becomes involved with a threat system.
A threat system contains virtually all the dialectical elements
found in a social process. It begins when one party says to another,
"You do something nice for me or I'll do something nasty to you."
Threat gains credibility in the face of an established pattern of
previously carried out threats.

The subsequent process depends on the

response from the threatened party.

Response could be expressed as

"defiance, avoidance, submission or counter-threat."
example of a threat-submission relation.

Slavery is an

Here, dialectics only express

themselves when the response changes into defiance or counter-threat.
This can occur when either geographical or social distance increases
between the threatener and the threatened.

"Revolution is a phenomenon

somewhat similar to war, with social distance replacing geographical
distance as the essential variable of the threat system" (Boulding 1970,
48).

Social distance may increase when, for instance, the son of the

threatener succeeds his father--or as a matter of course, when a faction
or class of society has organized a threat system to establish and
maintain itself as ruling group.

Namely, under threat conditions, the

ruling group "is cut-off from effective two-way communication," and
becomes unresponsive to the needs, opinions and sentiments of the
population.
formation.

Information feedback has little or no effect on policy
Governmental agents act without knowledge of results of
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previous policies.

This was true, for example, during the latter part

of the Hitler regime in Nazi Germany.
under Stalin (Miller 1978, 852).

It was also observed in Russia

This process magnifies the threat

system, and widens the gulf between ruler and ruled.

Gradual loss of

power, isolation at the top, fear and alienation of the population
evolve, and feed into the vicious cycle.

As Barnard has argued,

authority "is granted from below not from above” (qtd.
1968, 214).

in Boulding

Thus, at some point in space or time, a seemingly stable

system becomes unstable.

"Revolution can only occur if the social

distances between ruler and ruled are great” (Boulding 1970, 49).
Accordingly, "dialectical revolution" (in contrast to "nondialectical
revolution" discussed later in the text) involves "the emergence out of
one system of a rival system and the revolution takes place when the
rival system overcomes the former one and supplants it" (Boulding 1970,
58).
Moreover, distance, defiance and counter-threats are related to the
erosion of legitimacy. "Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system
to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political
institutions are the most appropriate for society" (Lipset 1963, 64).
In its classic Weberian formulation, legitimacy involves transformation
of naked power into authority which is generally accepted and obeyed
without frequent resort to coercion (Dekmejian in Curtis 1981, 33).
Namely, legitimacy may be established as product of the integrative
system--or it may be established by conquest, that is, by superior
threat.

As part of the threat system, legitimacy tends to erode with

time, rendering threats illegitimate, producing defiance and
counter-threats, schism, revolution, and war.

As Easton notes moreover,
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presence of hostility toward the government, what he calls "erosion of
support," or in Boulding*s terms "loss of power gradient," increases the
level of stress in the system.

"At least general types of systems, such

as absolute European monarchies, democracies, or dictatorships, have
unmistakably failed as support for them has atrophied" (Easton 1965,
220).

In Boulding's view, great changes are always nondialectical. They
are related to the growth of knowledge--which is "cumulative."
"Nondialectical revolutions" may play their part in history, as "step
functions."

They represent, however, not some inherent contradiction,

but rather, "discontinuity in the total evolutionary process because of
some mutation..."
whole system."

and can also have "profound long-term effect on the

The evolution of life itself, particularly of man, was a

nondialectical revolution (Boulding 1970, 57-58).
At the same time, nondialectical ideologies may become properties
of threat systems--if they become associated with centers of political
and economic power.

Dialectical dynamics develop if power is embodied

in a threat system.

Here, power relates to power-struggling, and thus

to the issue of "'who is the superior power’";
process, power relates to "bargaining power."

while in the exchange
The first kind of power

aims to destroy and supplant--the second kind of power aims only to move
to a more favorable position, still permitting a "positive-sum game"
(Boulding 1968).

Because a naked threat system is too costly to

maintain, the center of political power usually tries to become the
center of an integrative system, also.

It is an effort to gain status,

respect and willing acceptance, in short, legitimacy.

These ideological

systems tend to suffer from the same malaise as threat systems in
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general.

New power centers may emerge, proclaiming a new

ideology--which becomes the organizing principle for integration in
opposition to old centers.

Historical examples include the early

Christian Church vis-a-vis the Roman Empire.

In addition, "Islam

provided an integrative structure for Arabs and Arab conquests"
(Boulding 1970, 70).
Wallace, relatedly, analyzes this kind of process in terms of
"revitalization movements."

Those occur when groups perceive their

identity to be threatened, as for example, in situations of
international politics, modernization, or factionalism within the
society.

A group redefines the situation in opposition to an enemy, in

an effort to restore predictability.

when too many possibilities are already in the
field, and when orderliness diminishes, the only
possibility for improvemnet lies in simultaneously
simplifying the repertoire and insisting on
regularity of performance. Such procedure, often
carried out under the auspices of religion,
constitutes a revitalization movement (1966,
214-15).
Consequently, revitalization movements reduce the stress level in the
system, by serving as unifying, organizing, and integrating principle.
Sustained through rituals, they solve the self-identity dilemma (Wallace
1966).

Religion and ritual therefore, are processes in "dynamic

interaction (equilibration) with a changing environment";

they may even

constitute a "severe break in the continuity of the system" (d'Aquili,
et al 1979, 312).
Klapp, moreover, postulates how groups or societies reflect
distress and disintegration more concretely.

Namely, they may use
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"demagogic rhetoric,..
(1978, 91).

characterizing events in villainous terms"

The qualities imputed to "villains" reflect the kinds of

distress society is suffering.

Projecting distress onto "satan" or an

"oppressor" allows for renewed integration, and for "closing of the
system."

Villain images facilitate this process because they embody

anxiety in personal form, serving as focus for hostility.

In this

context, "villains" provide these three functions:
1) They sustain moral vigilance,
2) prepare for the "affirmative entrance and service of the hero,”
3) serve as reminders of "what kinds of people are to be feared,
and of the nature of evil" (Klapp 1973;

1978, 83,91,94).

These are similar to Erikson's postulations of "boundary
maintenance" to preserve or reestablish cohesion in communities in the
face of perceived threat to solidarity (Erikson 1966).
Research indicates, too, that such pejorative designators
facilitate violations against persons or groups thus designated.

(It is

easier to kill a "gook" than to kill a Vietnamese civilian) (Mueller
1969, 33).

The hero, in contrast, may emerge as "charismatic leader"

attributed with "...

formative power for initiating, creating,

governing, transforming, or destroying what is vital to man's life"
(Shils 1975, 258).
Such conflict dynamics, then, tend to reinforce old images, distort
and filter new information incompatible with old values, and thus impair
learning and development.

In the struggle between cultures, or between

two power centers, both lose the ability to learn from each other.
situation may occur between modernizing (westernizing) Third World
Nations, and the West.

Social change alone may create

This
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dissonance--because it challenges old values, views and methods.
"Reinforced" by a threat system, however, the process becomes self
defeating.

As Boulding notes:

The dialectical struggles, let us say, between
Christianity and Islam, between Catholicism and
Protestantism, between Capitalism and Communism, are
not essentially part of the knowledge process but
are essentially part of the threat system (1970,
62).
The exponents of religious or ideological systems often find support
among 'princes' who wish to legitimate their own counter-threat system
to some rival center of power.
In addition, dialectical views of the world, such as Marxism,
Fascism, racism, militarism, and nationalism, place high value on
conflict and subscribe to the idea of "defeating the enemy."

Rate of

conflict, that is, "the ratio of gain of the winning party to theloss
of the losing party," is high, in the presence of strong dialectical
elements (Boulding 1970, 52).

Because of the spiraling toxicity of the

conflictual exchange, the overall welfare of the entire system tends to
diminish.

This happens, for example, when the Communists take over the

Capitalists.

Processes of this kind are "terribly costly."

"stability" is precarious, at best.

And the new

Boulding considers dialectical

processes in history as retrogressive, and as symptoms of disease rather
than health.

14

RESEARCH QUESTIONS GOAL AND APPROACH

... all the world over and at all times there have
been practical men, absorbed in 'irreducible and
stubborn facts': all the world over and at all
times there have been men of philosophic temperament
who have been absorbed in the weaving of general
principles. It is this union of passionate interest
in the detailed facts with equal devotion to
abstract generalization which forms the novelty in
our present society (Whitehead, qtd. in Miller
1978, 6).

Accordingly, the framework outlined above furthers the "weaving of
general principles" by serving as template for historical facts.
Instead of linear cause and effect, the focus is on movement, that is,
on process within and among relationship systems, pivoting on one or
another organizing principle--where the unit of analysis is social
organization. Distance and legitimacy are important variables, and will
receive attention in relation to social organization and change.

Within

this context, I will address the following in relation to each other:
1) Shi'ism, as integrative system with a history of opposition to
the regime in power, as revitalization movement, and as apparent
contemporary "solution" for the Iranian people, including diverse
political and social groups;
2) the nature of the regime of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi--where
the threat system seemingly overshadowed the integrative and the
exchange system;
3) the major variables and relationships that contributed to the
explosive climate in Iran, such as distance and legitimacy;
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4)

the of role Khomeini in light of established principles and

practices of Shi'ism, as voice of the opposition, as charismatic leader,
and as "prince who legitimates his own threat system."
In this sense, the framework will serve my case study as context
for description of process, and illuminate the complexities, that is,
the patterns, issues and themes underlying the Iranian Revolution and
show how those were expressed.

The examples I will use are meant to be

illustrative, and provide plausible connections rather than demonstrate
incontrovertible theory.

To facilitate "verstehen" of reality from the

perspective of particular participants, description will include viewing
the world through the lens of the major actors and groups involved in
the dynamics that gave rise to violent change in Iran.

In this sense,

the study will have both, objective and subjective dimensions, and thus,
structural and interpretive elements.

I will rely on primary sources by

politicians who were involved in the shaping of history, and on
secondary sources by social scientists, historians, and journalists.
(See "Bibliography.")

ISLAM EMERGES:

AN INTEGRATIVE SYSTEM IN THE CONTEXT OF

SOCIAL CHANGE AND CONFLICT--A REVITALIZATION MOVEMENT7

Islam began in Mecca in 610 A.D.
Muhammad, a native of Mecca.

with the public preachments of

His rise to public life occurred against a

background of social and economic change, namely, from nomadic
pastoralism to commerce.

This process was associated with the weakening

of kinship ties, and with emphasis on locality and exchange as
organizing principles.

It also gave rise to economic and political
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monopolists.
humanity.

Muhammad claimed to have been sent by God to guide

He beckoned Meccans to worship, and brought warnings of

penalties for disobedience.

His message included reminders of social

obligations toward the lesser privileged.

Generally, the religious

proclamations of Muhammad addressed the growing social malaise of Mecca,
and might be viewed as voice of the opposition (Watt 1980, 4).
Perceived as threatening by some of the monopolists, he found his
freedom of speech curtailed, and his message largely rejected by
Meccans.

With seventy of his followers he migrated to Medina, an oasis

about 200 miles north of Mecca, in 622 A.
beginning of the Islamic calendar.

D.

It became the date of

The followers of Muhammad, mostly

young men, came from the following three groups:
monopolistic policies in Mecca;
practices;

1) opponents of

2) those impoverished by monopolistic

and 3) outsiders without clan protection (Watt 1961, 12).

Hostile nomadic clans had been able to avoid blood-feuding by
avoiding each others' migratory routes.

Having recently settled in

Medina, however, they suddenly found themselves within striking distance
of each other.

This potentially explosive situation provided fertile

ground for the emergence of a strong leader.

The Medinans found him in

Muhammad--whose message promised relief from social troubles, in spite
of its Meccan overtones.

Once the tribes had come together under the
leadership of Muhammad, they felt the influence of
their members and recognized also that it was Islam
that had brought an inspiring unity of purpose to
tribes accustomed to war upon another (Donaldson
1933, xxi).
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Muhammad called his new community umma.

In contrast to individual and

group pride as moral orientation, the new moral tone pervading the
community was based on the "...
maintained ...

individual's relationship to God, but

by the expectations prevalent in the group as a whole

and given form in their corporate life" (Hodgson 1974, 1:
new fundamental questions faced believers.

173).

Three

Namely, "how to live

correctly, how to think correctly, and how to organize correctly" (Von
Grunebaum in von Grunebaum 1955, 21).

Heathen ambitions of wealth,

power, and fame, remain acceptable only to the extent they are
integrated into the new organizational structure of life under Islam.
Moreover, as arbitrator and judge for the feuding tribes, Muhammad
gradually gained political authority.
new body politic with the "...

Out of this relationship grew a

scope for realizing the political

potentialities of the Qur'anic ideas" (Watt 1980, 4).

Also, Muhammad

ultimately gained control over Mecca, and developed ties with many of
the tribes of Arabia.
vision.

Muhammad "brought them something of a world

He called them to monotheism and gave them an intelligible

relationship between themselves and other monotheistic peoples"
(Donaldson 1933, xxi).

Thus, by the time of his death in 632 A.D., an

Islamic state existed, however, without defined geographical boundaries.
Only the abstracted boundary of a belief and integrative system, Islam,
defined the state.

Muhammad had been the religious and political

leader, and military commander of this state.
invading Arab armies brought Islam to Iran.

In ca.
By ca.

642 A.D.
800 A.D, the

majority of the population had been converted to Islam (Area Handbook of
Iran 1978, xii).
The message of Muhammad, the revelations to him from God, are
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permanently embodied in the Koran.
intimately.

Every Muslim must know them

The reports of the doings and sayings of the prophet, the

hadiths, represent another form of authority.

On the basis of both, the

ulama, the learned men of Islam and religious leaders, have elaborated
how Muslims ought to live.
Islam.

The rules became the shari'a, the law of

"In principle it covers every possible human contingency, social

and individual, from birth to death" (Hodgson 1974, 1:

74).

SHI'ISM IS BORN:
AN INTEGRATIVE SYSTEM IN OPPOSITION TO THE RULING GROUP
A REVITALIZATION MOVEMENT

Shi'at Ali (the party of Ali), commonly known as Shi'a, emerged as
faction in opposition to Sunnis, the group in power, and then developed
into a separate religious movement.

That is to say, only secondly did

Shi'is also "claim a distinct vision of religious truth" (Pipes in
Curtis 1981, 365).

Rather, the split revolved around issues of

authority and legitimate successorship of their leaders.

Problems of

authority and questions of legitimacy are recurring themes in Iranian
history.

It has been argued, that because of this legacy, Shi'ism

provides a "sharper cutting edge for social protest and political
activism" (Akhavi in Pullapily 1980, 189).
To elaborate, Muhammad's sons all died during childhood.

Fatima,

who married Ali, was Muhammad's only daughter to give him male heirs,
two boys, Hasan and Husayn.

According to Shi'i account, after

Muhammad's death, leadership should have passed to Ali, said to have
been with the Prophet at his last breath, and designated by him as
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successor (Fischer 1980, 13-14).

Stated in Muhammad's own words,

"Whoever recognises me as master, mawla, will know Ali as his master"
(Otd.

in Donaldson 1933, I).

Without a leader to interpret their

system of religion and exercise political authority in the tradition of
Muhammad, the prospect of the various tribes holding together was
minimal (Donaldson 1933, xxiii). The question of legitimate
successorship quickly allowed old inter-tribal conflicts to surface.
Thus, during the burial ceremony, instead of mourning Muhammad,

Abu

Bakr, the father-in-lawof the Prophet, and Umar, another close
associate, held an election.

They chose Abu Bakr to succeed Muhammad.

Abu Bakr died two years later;

Umar inherited the caliphate.

To insure

a successor of his choice, Umar named an election comittee of six men.
Of the two contenders, Uthman received the caliphate over Ali.
Eventually he was assassinated, and finally succeeded by Ali as fourth
caliph.

"Ali was the true Amin'1-Muminin, or Commander of the Faithful,

and as such should have been recognized as the immediate successor of
the Apostle of God" (Donaldson 1933, 14).
other three caliphs were usurpers.

In the eyes of the Shi'a, the

Only Ali had the "special

authority," acquired through his closeness to Muhammad, to lead the
community of the Prophet (Hodgson 1974, 1:

372).

Accordingly, the

Shi'a pledged their allegiance to the descendants of "Ali in the male
line" whom they called Imams.

From their perspective, Ali immediately

began "to put the houseof Islam in order" (Fischer 1980,

15).

As a matter of principle, then, Shi'is insisted on a ruler who "..
ruled by a kind of divine right and not as a nominee of the people"
(Watt 1961, 104).

Wherever a Shi'i group surfaced, it had a leader

(Pipes in Curtis 1981, 364-365;

Lewis 1973).

The Shi'i movement was a
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group of people who found meaning and security in following a
"charismatic leader" (Sunderland in Fischer 1968, 674).

As Shils

observes fittingly, "the disposition to attribute charisma is directly
related to the need for order" (1975, 263).

Both, great capacity for

violence, that is to say, "order destroying power" with the promise of
greater harmony in the future, or "order creating, diclosing or
discovering power" can attract attribution of charisma (Shils 1975).
Ali, however, met with the same fate as had his predecessor;
was assassinated "on the nineteenth day of Ramadam A.H.
praying in the mosque of Kufa."
today.

he

40 while

The Shi*a still hold him in high esteem

They admire him for his many virtues, and particularly for going

to his death in spite of knowing he would be murdered, and for treating
his future assassin kindly.
Again, the successorship left the direct line of the Prophet and
went to Mu'awiya, over the politically weak Hasan, Ali's older son.
Mu'awiya had Hasan poisoned, in an effort to ensure the caliphate to his
own son, Yazid.

When Yazid eventually gained leadership, Husayn, Ali's

younger son, refused to recognize him in that role.
sealed his own fate;

He consequently

on his way to Kufa where his father had been

assassinated, Yazid and his men intercepted Husayn, and forced him to
camp in the desert of Karbala.
of his party were slain;

After ten days, Husayn and all the men

women and children were taken prisoners.

Because this martyrdom occurred on Friday noon, the time of communal
prayer, the act had even graver implications.

Out of the schism among

the believers grew a distinct form of Islam, namely, Shi'ism.

The basic

difference then, between the Sunni and the Shi'i Sect of Isam, is that
"...

to Sunnis Abu Bakr, Umar and Mu'awiya are good caliphs, men

21

without whom the survival of Islam would have to be questioned" (Fischer
1980, 21).

Conversely, to Shi'is, these men perverted Islam.

By

following them, and abandoning Ali, Muslims had abandoned "the truth"
(Hodgson 1974, I:

372).

Shi'is refuse to recognize them as Imams.

Because of them, Islam had been unable to "fulfill its promise as just
social system."

THE ELABORATION OF IRANIAN SHI'ISM AS INTEGRATIVE SYSTEM
IN THE CONTEXT OF THREAT

Following the murders of Ali and Husayn, their disciples, a
minority amongst Sunnis, were fiercly persecuted.

In this context,

Jafar al-Sadiq, the sixth Imam in the line of Ali, allegedly instituted
the principle of the Imamate, and hence divorced religious authority
from political rule;

until God would decide otherwise.

The Umayyad

caliphs, victoriously ruling the Arab empire from their capitol of
Damascus tested people to detect Shi'is, by insulting Ali and his
followers.

Those unable to pass the test were put to death.

Shi'is

thus adopted the principle of taqiyya (dissimulation of their true
beliefs) in an effort to escape this fate.

This principle states, "...

it is legitimate to dissemble if one is in the hands of an enemy, or
believes with reason that one's life is threatened" (Heikal 1981, 87).
Al-Sadiq advised believers to fear for their religion, "and to protect
if with taqiyya, for there is no faith when there is no taqiyya" (Jafri,
qtd.

in Bayat 1982, 4).

Simultaneously, he declared the political

function of the Imam, "to wage holy war for the establishment of justice
and equity on earth," postponed, and requested his followers to refrain
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from challenging political authority.

At the same time, dissimulation

fostered the tendency "to form closed and often secret bodies of the
elect" (Hodgson 1974, 2:

198).

Thus, Shi1ism gradually developed its own form of piety, and its
own variants of the Shari'a (Hodgson 1974, 2:

372).

During the eighth

and ninth century, in reaction to challenges of orthodox Shi'i views,
the ulama gained their own corporate identity.

Although their origin

dates back to the early period of Islam, as guardians of the words of
Allah, and as controllers of public worship--it was during this time,
the Shi1a ulama established a separate school of theology and
jurisprudence.

Kufa in Iraq, Qum in Iran, and Aleppo in Syria came

under Shi’i influence (Akhavi 1980, 5).

They still principally

distinguished themselves through their insistence that spiritual
leadership succeeded through Ali, in the series of twelve Imams (Wilber
1981, 82-3;

Bayat 1982, 5).

After the death of al-Sadiq in 765 A.D.,

most of his followers paid allegiance to his son Musa al-Kazim, as
seventh Imam.

The succession ends with Muhammad al-Mahdi as twelfth

Imam, in 874 A.D.

(An activist Shi’i splinter group formed in 765 A.D.,

following al-Sadiq’s other son Ismail, as seventh and last Imam.

They

are called Ismailis or Seveners). According to Shi’i creed, each of the
twelve Imams is said to have had devine infallibility, each could work
miracles, each named his own successor, and each--except the twelfth
Imam--met with death by violence (Wilber 1981, 83).

The twelth, or

Hidden Imam went into hiding (occultation) in a cave, and will
eventually return as Mahdi when the world approaches its end.

Because

of this legacy, Iranian Shi’is are also known as Imami or Twelver Sect
(Akhavi 1980, 6).

While the title al-Mahdi originally merely designated
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the "ideal Islamic ruler"--with the introduction of the occultation,
coupled with the promise of the return "of the future restorer of
justice" the title gained "eschatological tones in Imami Shi'ism"
(Sachedina 1981, 68-9).
For about seventy years, from 874 until 940 A.D., a series of four
vakils (deputies) represented the Hidden Imam on earth.
known as Lesser Occultation.

This period is

The last of the four vakils died without

designating a successor, "leaving the matter in the hands of God."
(Earliest prophecy held the Mahdi would return after seventy years).
The Shi'a, left without a leader, decided after lengthy deliberation,
that the mujtahids should represent the Hidden Imam on earth, until his
return.

These events ushered in the period of Greater Occultation

(Savory in Curtis 1981, 133).

It was a time of hardship for the

Shi'is --because it became increasingly obvious to them that the
appearance of the Mahdi "in the near future" was uncertain.

They "were

being tested and sifted and purified, until the matter became clear for
them;

this will apparently occur with the appearance of the Imam"

(Sachedina 1981, 100).

Also beginning at ca.

800 A.D., Iranian

Nationalism gained expression through growing adherence to Shi'ism (Area
Hanbook of Iran 1978, xii). Shi'ism thus continued to serve as
integrative system in opposition to other groups.
According to historical records, the Shi'a had remained discreet in
opposing temporal rule, and had refrained from participating in
politics, during the lifetime of the twelve Imams, with the exception of
the eighth Imam, Ali Reza.

The Sunni Caliph Ma'mun designated Imam Ali

Reza as heir apparent to the caliphate, and summoned him to the far away
Merv.

Ma'mun had been strongly influenced by his vizier, Fadl ibn Sahl,

24

known as sympathetic to Persians and Shi'is.

"...

[A]s a master stroke

of diplomacy, in his opinion, he arrived at the decision to attempt to
conciliate the Shi'ites by designating their Imam as his successor to
the Caliphate" (Donaldson 1933, 163).

The Imam took great pains to

explain he had no choice but to obey.

In contrast to his last three

predecessors, he thus became involved in politics, by accepting the
nomination to the calipahte.

In the process, according to Shi'i

account, his enemies poisoned him.

He is buried in Mashad.

Shi'is

maintain, Ali Reza had been forced to accept the proposal of Caliph
Ma'mun--although he had strongly expressed his preference to stay out of
all secular administrative duties (Donaldson 1933, 161-9).
The Shi'a worship Imams as martyrs and make pilgrimages to Mecca,
to Karbala, to Najaf in Iraq, to Mashad to the Shrine of Aliz Reza, the
eigth Imam, and to the Shrine of Fatima, the "pure one" in Qum.
their numerous holidays are intensely sad occasions.
according to the lunar calendar of Islam.

Most of

They occur

One particularly

intense mourning period, during the month of Muharram, marks the tragedy
Karbala, remembered in sermons, flagellations and tragic plays.
climax on Ashura, the 10th of Muharram.

These

Mourners slash themselves with

knives and whip themselves with chains, "to demonstrate the overwhelming
nature of their grief" (Savory in Curtis 1981, 133).

The reenactment of

the martyrdom of Husayn through passion plays has a particularly
catharctic effect.

What rains down? Blood! Who? The Eye! How? Day
and Night! Why? From grief! What grief? The
grief of the Monarch of Karbala! What was his name?
Husayn! of (sic) Whose race? Ali's! Who was his

25

mother? Fatima! Who was his grandsire? Mustafa!
How was it with him? He fell a martyr! Where? In
the Plain of Mariya! When? On the 10th of
Muharram! Secretly? No, in public! Was he slain
by night? No, by day! At what time? Noontide!
Was his head severed from his throat? No, from the
nape of the neck! Was he slain unthirsting? No!
Did none give him to drink? They did! Who? Shimr!
From what source? From the source of death (Savory
in Curtis 1981, 133)!
During these rituals, the villain image of Yazid may serve the functions
postulated by Klapp, namely:

1)sustain moral vigilance;

the "affirmative entrance and service of the hero";

2)prepare for

3)serve as reminder

of "what kind of people are to be feared, and of the nature of evil"
(Klapp 1973;

1978, 83, 91,94).

In this sense, use of the Karbala

symbolism may become a manipulative force.

It would be often used by

Khomeini in relation to the Shah and to the United States Government.
In the eyes of believers, the Shah became '"the Yazid ofthe age,'"
(Algar in Keddie 1972, 233).

As Minorsky asserts, "Even up to our day,

Shi'ism with its overtones and its aroma of opposition, of martyrdom,
and of revolt, is matched quite well with the Persian character--a
character formed in the course of a long history which is very different
from the history of other peoples nearby" (In von Grunebaum 1955, 201).
In light of this history, according to Fischer, the various expressions
of Shi'ism "can be viewed as cultural forms composed of symbolic
structure" (1980, 4).
For centuries then, Shi'ism has pervaded public and private life.
As a way of life, it lends context and meaning, serving as lens through
which believers view the world.

The hadith within th Qu'ran, the

traditions of the Imams, and the interpretations of their spiritual
heirs, the Shi'a ulama, offer all sources of knowledge and guidance for
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behavior.

The shar'ia (religious law) offered the sole legal code for

most of these centuries.

For believers, the following holds:

Islam is based on knowledge and is not separated
from it.... Therefore, if science progresses it
cannot affect the laws of Islam... because no
knowledge can be higher than God's and in Islam all
knowledge comes from God (Thaiss in Yar-Shater 1971,
192) .
Contemporarily, four main styles of Shi'ism can be identified,
namely:

1) the religion of the masses populating the villages;

2) the

religion of the madrasas or colleges that train religious leaders;
Sufism, a "mystical counterculture";
religion of the upper classes.

3)

and 4) the more private, "ethical"

Some have argued there is a fifth style,

a combination of the second and fourth, that became the ideology of the
revolution (Fischer 1980, 4).

Defense of faith occurs on three levels,

the popular, the political, and the scholarly (Fischer 1980, 32).

At

the popular level, the bazaaris represent an invaluable mobilizing
force--because they are both a business organization and a "web of
social communication."
The madrasas have been the central agent in the "cultural
involution" of Shi'ism since the sixteenth century by maintaining and
elaborating a symbolic world (Fischer 1980, 32).
madrasas takes place in the hawza (circle);

Education at the

that is, disciples collect

around a teacher and internalize his interpretations and connotations.
Students choose their own teachers and develop strong bonds of respect
for and devotion to them.

Teaching rests on the dialectic principle of

argument and counterargument.
their own speed.

There are no grades.

Students proceed at

"For each there is a place according to his capacity
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and inclination:

a village preacher (akhund) need not be a legal expert

(mujtahid)" (Fischer 1980, 61).

Fischer noted there are limits to

debate with students for the following reasons:

1) their "conscious

limit of knowledge and a forced reliance on authority figures who
presumably know more";

2) their belief that certain things are

questionable and others are explicable only through traditional
procedures;

and 3) "the force of dramatic aesthetic" that revolves

"around the lives of the three first imams in particular."

There is

strong resistance toward anything that might reduce the dramatic impact
of these stories (Fischer 1980, 75-6).
Scholarly hierarchy consists of six levels.

The entry level is

that of the talib ilm (learner). Upon graduation he becomes a muthahid
(someone who has exerted himself so as to be able to frame an opinion).
Based on the criteria of learning and piety, believers may choose him as
marja-i taqlid (source of imitation and supreme authority on law) (Algar
in Keddie 1972, 235;

Fischer in Esposito 1983, 153).

The third level

is that of mubelleg-al-risala (carrier of the message). Fourth is the
level of hojat al Islam (authority of Islam).
student may form his own hawza.

At this level, the

The more followers he gathers, the

closer he comes to attaining the fifth level, that of the ayatollah
(sign of God). The ultimate level is the sixth level that of the
ayatollah al-uzma (great sign of God). Anyone at this level personifies
the margieieh (the individual to be referred to on everything) (Heikal
1981, 83).

To attain this grade, the candidate must be accepted by

members already in the grade, and must be able to offer them a
theological treatise "of sufficient merit."

Khomeini advanced to this

level with a treatise entitled "Tahrir al-Wasilah" (The Liberation of
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the Means). Because the number five has special meaning for
Moslems--there are only five ayatollahs al-uzma at any one time.^
Based on the Persian constitution of 1906 they cannot be arrested.
Consequently, after Khomeini advanced to that level, the Shah could no
longer arrest him, and exiled him instead (Heikal 1981, 83).
The geographical location of the madrasas, and related dynamics,
further emphasize their centrality.

Madrasas tend to be attached to

major mosques, many of which encircle the bazaar, at the old core of
most cities.
Islam."

Behind this configuration lies the "major bulwark of Shi'i

To elaborate, mosques, in contrast to churches, consist mainly

of open courtyards that serve as gathering places. People go there in
large numbers to "pray, walk, discuss, meditate, listen, hold
meetings--breathe" (Kapuscinski 1985, 76).

Much of the bazaar

constitutes the waqf (endowment) for the religious institutions.

An

estimateed 80 percent of the clergy's income, and much of the financial
support for the madrasas, comes from the bazaar.

(Koranic doctrine also

entitles religious teachers to one fifth of the income of his hawza)
(Heikal 1982, 84).

In turn, the bazaaris conduct business within the

framework of the Islamic order, elaborated by the clergy in terms of
interpretations of economic morality and law.

The bazaaris also

"supplement and complement the function of the mullahs" through
organized missions (hey'at), "each in charge of religious gathering
places other than mosques" (Zabih 1979, 29).

Hey'ats complement guilds

and represent a cross-section of the bazaar community (Spooner in
Yar-Shater 1971, 170-3).
site.

Passion plays take place at Taaziyeh, one such

Hosseinyeh, another site serves as center for mourning the dead,

and Mahdiyeh for religious instruction and recital of the Koran.
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Bazaaris also organize thousands of pilgrimages and appoint leaders for
the major processions in the Islamic calender, the most important being
Ashura.

Submission to the leadership of these bazaaris, reputed to be

pious and wise, occurs through informal means.

For instance, any

bazaari denied the endorsement of the leader, may as well close his
shop.

Business will decline dramatically.

At the same time,

intermarriage and parochial association maintain solidarity.
In addition, bazaaris provide links to many other social strata.
They maintain ties with peasants by trading agricultural surplus for
consumer goods;

also, their families yield many teachers, tradesmen,

lawyers, journalists, technocrats, and middle ranking military
personnel.

During the constitutional movement (1905-1911), and later,

during the revolution (1977-1979), this symbiosis between the bazaaris
and their entire network, on the one hand, and the ulama, on the other
hand, represented a powerful anti-government force.

In modern times, there has been a continual dialogue
between the bazaar and the regime. The shah was one
of the main foci of foreign influence in the
society; the bazaar is xenophobic, explicitly in
the interests of conservative interpretation of the
traditional religion. The religious class provides
the main spokesmen of the bazaar, and so the
religious idiom of social action in the bazaar is
further reinforced (Spooner in Yar-Shater 1971,
171) .
Moreover, the corporateness and social organization of the bazaar
constituted the pillar that rendered the Iranian ulama in many respects
sui generis (Zabih 1979, 27-32;

Akhavi in Pullapilly 1980, 189;

in Bonine and Keddie 1981, 233- 58).

Bonine

Their independent financial status

also differentiates them in a concrete way from their Sunni
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counterparts --who receive their income through the state (Heikal 1982,
83-4).

SHI1ISM CONTINUES AS INTEGRATIVE SYSTEM IN THE FACE OF THREAT

In contrast to Sunni states where in the name of unity of the
Islamic state caliphs condoned the usurption of their military and
political power by amirs or sultans, preferring even despotism to
anarchy--the ulama of Iran have been trying to maintain the units of
politics and religion in the face of the disappearance of the Imam and
the establishment of a temporal government (Akhavi 1980, 15;
Curtis 1981, 130-31).

Savory in

They have never retracted the assertion that only

the Imam is legitimately entitled to rule, and have consistently
regarded the caliphate as symbol of oppression and injustice (Bayat
1982, 5).

Until the reappearance of the Imam, the mujtahids interpret

the Koran for the umma.

In this sense, temporal rule could be

considered tolerable as long as it defers to religious advice and to the
injunctions of the mujtahids. Interestingly, the revolutionaries of
1977-1979 apply the term Imam to Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini.
Temporal authorities, on the other hand, have in various ways tried
to undermine the power of the ulama.

Under the more centralized

government of Shah Ismail Safavi, however, Imami Shi'ism "burst on the
scene" in 1501/02 as a "millenarian charismatic movement," and became
the state religion of Iran (Akhavi 1980, 6).

The dynasty offered

Shi'ism as integrative system, to a peoples devastated by years of war,
anarchy, and disintegration.
to Sunni rule.

They formed a united front in opposition

In this way the Shi'i religious order gave rise to a
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routinized administration in opposition to the Sunni Ottoman Empire
which constituted the main threat to the country.

Through annexation of

vast areas some of the Shi'i shrines, together with their endowments,
came under Shi'i control.
came into existence.

'"...

The position of the mullabashi (chief mullah)
some sources suggest the direct religious

rule by means of concourse of mujtahids above the monarch'" (Savory in
Curtis 1981, 135).

During this marriage, the state declined in

political, military, and economic power--while the religious order
"exaggerated the status of the religious learned class."

This

reenforced the doctrine that only the Imam is entitled to rule. Until
the return of the twelfth Imam, "dynasties simply hold the fort"
(Spooner in Yar-Shater 1971, 171).

Then, in the eighteenth century,

Nadir Shah once again weakened Shi'i hierarchy by abolishing core
positions (Donaldson 1933, 60-2).
It was later, under the Qajar dynasty (1796-1925) that the ulama
regained a stronger position under conditions that seemed to threaten
Iranian sovereignty and separate identity.
associated with Westernization.
boundaries of Iran.

Namely, the Qajars became

Foreigners seemed to violate the

Muhammad Shah (1834-1848), like Mohammed Reza

Pahlavi 130 years later, received the designation of "'the Yazid of the
age.'" Rumors also circulated connecting the Qajars with the Umayyads,
and thus with the slaughter at Karbala.

These rumors became more

intense during the Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911).

From their

center in Najaf, located in Ottoman territory, and therefore outside of
the political influence of the Qajar empire, the ulama "began to
reassert its authority" (Donaldson 1933, 63).

Certain factions of the

clergy increasingly committed themselves to participation in the
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strictly political realm, and eventually openly agitated against the
dynasty's claim to govern.

They expressed opposition through

constitional protest, and through direct involvement in demonstrations,
strikes and other measures.

Consistent with their xenophobia and their

struggle over sovereignty, they issued their first open protest in 1891
against the British tobacco monopoly, asking "all believers" to cease
using tobacco.
the ulama.

The constitution of 1905-1906 gave "legal expression" to

It replaced the 'urf system, based on the outlook of the

respective monarch in power, with a civil code, based largely on the
shari'a.

Legislation advanced the clergy into one of the "'ranks'" of

society.

Clergy were elected to parliament.

Through a committee to

"protect" holy law from bad decisions and maintain it, the clergy felt
they were representing the Imam's and the people's concept of social
justice at the same time.

Within their own ranks the clergy had

different perceptions of the concept of sovereignty, and were
consequently divided in some of their responses.

One faction viewed

sovereignty belonging only to Allah, upheld through the clergy--the
other faction saw sovereignty reposed in the nation.

The factions

finally succeeded in drafting "Article 35 of the Supplementary
Fundamental Law."

It states "Sovereignty is a trust confided (as a

Divine Gift) by the people to the person of the King" (Akhavi 1980, 27).
According to Donaldson, this is a "tacit recognition that the hidden
Imam is the one in ultimate authority" (1933, 63).

In 1909, a leading

religious figure forwarded a constitutional treatise asking the "nations
religious leaders to play a corrective role in society to amend the
excesses of political officials by means of right guidance" (Akhavi
1980, 15).
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As Algar asserts, involvement of the ulama in the Constitutional
Revolution may partly be taken as a sign that the government had strayed
too far from the authoritative guidance of the mujtahids.

The

underlying tension had given way to "open rupture" (In Keddie 1972,
235).

Keddie, in addition, views lack of centralization in terms of

geographical conditions, and in terms of ethnic diversity, together with
"concessions to Westerners," as major contributors to the ulama's
uprising (Keddie 1972, 25-6).

Seemingly then, Shi'ism, and its

structure of religious authority once again facilitated the "closing of
the system" in an attempt to restore predictability and integration,
this time in open opposition to the government.

Opposition expressed

itself in religious terms and metaphors with symbolic meaning.

As in

the early days of Islam, the abstracted boundary of a belief system
substituted for lack of a defined, concrete boundary of the state.
Religion and ritual, therefore, are processes in "dynamic interaction
(equilibration) with a changing environment" (d'Aquili, et al 1979,
312) .

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PAHLAVI DYNASTY:
ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW THREAT SYSTEM

In spite of its declaration of neutrality, Russian and British
troops invaded Iran shortly after the outbreak of World War I.

Major

Iranian cities became pivotal points of espionage for Russian, German,
and British agents.
Iranian soil.

Turkish and Russian troops fought each other on

These destructive forces intensified internal anarchic

conditions, the result of weak leadership by Ahmad Shah.

For example,

34

peasants suffered from extortions by landlords because of the complete
absence of central authority.

Thus, while Iran was experiencing

internal upheaval, dislocations also affecting Iran, were occurring on
the international scene.

It was an interlude "dominated by 'power of

foreigners, the bad example of greedy leaders, the breakdown of the
religious institution and morality it should have upheld'" (Akhavi 1980,
25).

Because of the Russian Revolution of 1917, Russia withdrew most of

its forces from Iran.

The British remained the only dominant power in

Iran, and drew up a treaty with the intent of placing Iran completely
under British control.

Then, a revolt in Iraq caused security problems

for the British in the region of the Persian Gulf.

Perceiving weakness,

and succumbing to popular pressure, the Iranian Majlis repudiated the
Treaty of Alliance with the United Kingdom.

As anarchic conditions

continued, Iran signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union in
1921.
On February 21, 1921, Colonel Reza Khan, the father of Shah
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, backed the Iranaian journalist Sayyid Zia Din
Tabatabai in a bloodless military coup d'etat with the forces of a
Persian Cossak Brigade.

Three months later, upon the departure of

Tabatabai, Colonel Reza Khan, the minister of war and commander in chief
of the army, came to dominate the history of Iran between World War I
and World War II (Area Handbook of Iran 1978, 52-53;
He aimed to accomplish the following:
his own career;

1) establish order;

3) free Iran from external control;

the country (Akhavi 1980, 27).

Preece 1979, 3-8).
2) promote

and 4) modernize

As Reza Pahlavi, he consolidated power

over the military and over political positions.

In addition to the

military as his power base, he enjoyed civilian support through segments

35

of the following four political parties:

1) the conservatives of the

Reformers party (Hizb-i Eslah Taleban); 2) the reformers of the Revival
party (Hizb-i Tajadod);

3) the radicals of the Socialist party (Hizb-i

Sosiyalist); and 4) the revolutionaries of the Communist party
(Abarahamian 1982, 120).

In 1923, he took the office of Prime Minister.

In 1925, he convened a Constituent Assembly to despose the Qajar Dynas ty
(1796-1925) and ascended to the imperial throne.

"In April of the

following year, wearing a military uniform and the royal jewels, he
crowned himself, in the style of his hero Napoleon, the Shah-in-Shah of
Iran" (Abrahamian 1982, 120).
Shah Reza's legacy emerged as deeply antithetical to the ulama, and
to religious tradition.

In the early 1920s, he had attempted to develop

relations with the ulama to win political power;

after his coronation

ceremony in 1925, however, he discontinued these relations and pursued
secularization of society.

In the course of this pursuit, distance

between him and the majority of the Iranian people grew.

"...

the

impact of secularization is mainly associated with him, a fact that time
and again emerges in discussions with Iranians of the older generation"
(Akhavi 1980, xvi). Namely, by 1930 under Reza Shah, the power of the
ulama in the field of law had been eroded, beginning with the
dismantling of the shar (religious courts) in 1926.

As Faghfoory

observed:

Whereas the 'ulama* constituted forty percent of the
deputies in the Sixth Majlis (1926-1928), and around
thirty percent in the Seventh (1930-1932), the
Eleventh Majlis which met in 1937 did not include
even a single well-known and important figure from
the ulama (qtd. in Akhavi 1980, 59).
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Civil and criminal codes based on French law replaced the shari'a
(Preece 1979, 5).

Also in 1926, the government of Iran instituted

conscription law that allowed the state to decide over exemption from
military duty in the newly established, rapidly growing, national army.
Consequently, the state could draft, and hence control, members of the
ulama perceived as threatening to the regime.

Reza Shah further

outlawed passion plays, thus eliminating an important catharctic outlet,
and began massive campaigns persuading people to dress like Europeans.
He ordered men to wear brimmed hats, instead of their brimless ones.
Brimmed hats prevented them from touching the ground with their
foreheads in prayer.

He banned chadors--the police tore them off the

terrified women in the streets (Kapuscinski 1985, 22).

One eyewitness

reported:

I was in time to see police tearing silken scarves
from the women's heads and handing them back in
ribbons to their owners; for anything even remotely
resembling a veil was forbidden.... It was not the
men who wished their women to be veiled so much as
the women themselves who clung modestly to the old
customs (qtd. in Arasteh 1970, 105).
When the faithful protested, as in Meshed in 1935-1936, calling on Imam
Husayn to protect them from the "evil Shah"--he sent in the army to
quiet them.

He resorted to military force after city policemen had

refused to violate the sanctity of the shrine.

City officials rushed

about with their European hats hidden under their jackets, producing
them only as they passed each other.
resulted from the crackdown.

Arrests, flogging and deaths

The British Consul noted that although
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"the prompt display of military force certainly deterred the opposition,
the bloodshed served to widen the gulf between the shah and the country"
(Abrahamian 1982, 152).
unveiled in public.

The monarch's wife and daughter appeared

In this connection, Reza Shah personally beat a

mullah with a cane in one of the mosques of Qum, for speaking out
against the incident.
Reza Shah also placed severe restrictions on religious education,
one of the strongholds of the ulama.

For instance, under him,

legislation was passed dictating examination and licensing of religious
teachers;

and the faculty of Theology was established as "one of four

constitutive colleges" at Tehran University, as direct challenge to the
influence of the madrasas.

He "emasculated" the power base of the ulama

by keeping guilds and bazaaris under strict governmental control.
Police officers had to be present at guild meetings (Arasteh 1970, 104).
He destroyed parts of main bazaars by building broad avenues in the
context of his modernization program (Bonine in Bonine and Keddie 1981,
235).

In addition, Shah Reza stripped deputies of their parliamentary

immunity, closed down newspapers, walled up protesting liberals in
towers, and ordered settlement of the nomadic tribes.
their protest, he had their wells poisoned.

In response to

Thus, through formal and

informal harassment, he succeeded to intimidate the ulama and other
groups (Akhavi 1980, Kapuscinski 1985).

The traditional middle class,

and most of the clergy grew to hate him intensely.

The older generation

of intelligentsia also gradually withdrew their support--while their
younger counterparts practiced passive opposition (Abrahamian 1982,
153) .

Although Reza Khan never outgrew many of his habits from his
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village childhood or his time in a military barracks, still sleeping on
the floor and eating from the same pot with his soldiers --his despotic
rule, and his greed for money and power, overshadowed more humble
dimensions.

He was always in uniform;

accumulated massive wealth.

and, coveting land and money, he

Under his rule legislation passed to

strengthen the position of the landed group.

The wealthy gained the

right to claim land to which peasants held old titles, and became able
to declare whole villages as private property.

The Shah himself became

the largest landowner, and claimed 3,000 villages and 250,000 peasants
his own.

Medieval methods, however, encouraged low productivity, and

kept agrarian conditions "backward.” To demonstrate ownership, he even
ordered the public execution of a donkey that had trespassed onto one of
his meadows.

Neighboring villagers forcibly witnessed the execution

(Kapuscinski 1985, 23).

In addition, the Shah owned stock in factories

and banks, and continually multiplied his fortune.

An authority on Iran

said this of him:

Paradoxically, the modernization of Persia was
accomplished by a man who could hardly be called
cultural--a man who recognized his own limitations
by insisting that he was just a soldier. Unlike the
upper-class Persian, he did not feel the spell of
many centuries of civilization; free of the fetters
of the past, he could institute reforms and thrust
obstacles aside with ruthlessness and rude vigor....
Reza Shah in a few years eradicated usages and
practices that had seemed part of the very tissue of
Persian life. He transformed institutions and
uprooted convictions which had been held sacred
(Haas qtd. in Arasteh 1970, 103).
At the same time, in contrast to his son after him, he attempted to
modernize while eliminating foreign presence, and diminish dependence on
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Britain and on the USSR.

He, too, saw the clergy as retrogressive force

in the context of modernization.

Because of his eccentricity, his

cruelty, and his unresponsiveness to the bulk of the population,
particularly from his coronation onward--he received little of the
credit due him for saving Iran from dissolution.

In 1941, his

dictatorial grip succumbed to Allied occupation of Iran.

Trying to

preserve his friendship with Germany finally became his demise.
pressure he went into exile in South Africa.
apathetic.

Under

Iran was still poor and

Ecstatic crowds of Iranians celebrated his departure.

Reza

Shah died in exile in 1944.

SUCCESSION OF THE PAHLAVI DYNASTY--SUCCESSION OF A THREAT SYSTEM
SOCIAL DISTANCE INCREASES

Under chaotic conditions on the national and international scene,
Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi began his turbulent 38 year reign on
September 16, 1941.

In retrospect Hoveyda offers this:

The Shah did not seem very sure of himself in those
days. His entourage, though deferential, passed
remarks to him. The ambassador observed protocol
but treated him rather like a child. Outwardly very
shy, he listened attentively, and in moments of
hesitation cast desperate glances toward familiar
faces (Hoveyda 1980, 125).
Young and inexperienced, he aimed to promote a guided, gradual
democracy.

Nevertheless, he followed in his father's footsteps, and

aqcuired the image of a despot.
To elaborate, the state under Mohammed Reza Pahlavi (1941-1978) has

40

been described as "neopatrimonial form of monarchy, relying heavily on
built in rivalries, overlapping responsibilities in the bureaucracy and
secret police terror to concentrate power at the top" (Fischer 1980, 9).
"Under his rule, Iran saw 24 different prime ministers heading more than
40 cabinets" (Green 1982, 15).
attempts.

He escaped two official assassination

At the same time, the nation "evolved into a complex

collection of contradictions that have fascinated and confounded
observers for over 20 years" (Green 1982, xi). His view of the world
involved leading his country "towards a great civilization"--it was his
"answer to history" (Pahlavi 1980).

His definition of civilization

seemed to differ dramatically from the definition of many Iranians.
Thus, as will be discussed in the following sections, both, his outlook
and subsequent method, seemingly alienated the vast majority of his
people, and apparently left religion as a primary idiom of political
protest, and as means to integration and illusory safety.
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi inherited his father's legacy together with
the throne, and with the legitimacy of the monarchy principally
questioned.

The prestige of the new dynasty was at a low after
the army failed to react against occupation and
after Reza Shah accepted abdication. There were
many individuals and groups who had suffered under
the heavy handed rule of Reza Shah, and most of
these looked forward to settling old scores with the
new Shah (Binder 1980, 9).
Denied real army support (because the military had been "reconstituted
of non-aristocratic elements by Reza Shah") without legitimacy
sanctioned by the ulama, with an anarchic, almost independently
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functioning cabinet, and faced with a variety of new political parties,
including the Marxist oriented Tudeh party, the new Shah tried to
establish royal authority.

In the absence of "love, respect or

legitimacy," he strove to continue modernization begun by his father
(Binder 1980, 9).
According to Boulding's postulations of how distance increases in a
threat system between ruler and ruled--distance had increased with
succession of the throne from father to son.

Thus forced to maneuver

for support and authority in an hostile environment, exacerbated by the
political framework of Allied occupation under British dominance, the
Shah resorted to "compromise, bargaining, favoritism, occasional
swallowing of pride, indirection, intrigue, and the playing off of
rivals against each other" (Binder 1980, 9).
During the next twelve years, until the tightening of the
dictatorship following the Mossadeq interlude in August 1953, power
struggling continued between the following five separate poles:

"the

court, the Majlis, the cabinet, the foreign embassies, and the general
public" (Abrahamian 1982, 170).

Social upheavals, political crises, and

diplomatic storms continually rocked the country.

At the same time, the

Shah's relation with the ulama was one of tenuous accommodation in need
of support.

Because of the weakened condition of the state, the clergy

were able to regain some of their influence--until the conflict
sharpened, eighteen years into the rule of the Shah (Akhavi 1980, 59).
Nevertheless, the clergy failed to regain control of the country's legal
and educational system.

They also had difficulty uniting either in

favor of, or against issues in the 1940s and 1950s, which included the
following:

1) womens suffrage;

2) the clergy's joining political
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parties;

3) the nationalization of the Anglo-American Oil Company

(AIOC) and the destruction of foreign influence;
published by the press;

5) land laws;

4) the subject matter

6) communism and leftwing

challenges (by and large considered identical by the clergy); 7) the
growing autocracy of the Shah;

and 8) corruption of the regime (Akhavi

1980, 63).
To illustrate, the Shah allowed women to return to veils;
chose.

if they

It was a "choice" enforced by a fatwa (ruling on religious law),

signed by fifteen mujtahids, forbidding women to shop unveiled in
bazaars and markets.

Women’s enfranchisement appeared to be one of the

safer issues--and the ulama largely agreed.
however, on joining political parties.
parliament, and served in the majlis.

They failed to agree,

Several clergy had run for
It was against the advice of the

Qum ulama, and some of their Tehran colleagues.

The clergy were also

divided over nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC)
which occurred in 1951.

Oil nationalization partly expressed the

prevailing anti-foreign sentiments.
Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Mossadeq rose to power and
ousted the Shah.

He presided over oil nationalization by forcing it

through parliament.

Under him, the National Front came into existence

with three major elements at its core, namely:

1) prominent anti-court

politicians, 2) bazaar-connected politicians, and 3) young,
western-educated radicals (Abrahamian 1982, 252).

They thus represented

divergent forces that came together in the common struggle for honest
elections, freedom of the press, nationalization of the oil company
(owned by the British), and against the court and military complex,
attracted by the "charismatic personality of Mossadeq" (Abrahamian 1972, .
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252-60).

(Some of the anti-Shah elements of 1978-1979 came from these

three groups). During the brief time in office of Mossadeq in
1952-1953, Qum, the "Holy City," became the center of clashes between
political and religious factions.

Alarmed over Mossadeq's reliance on

communist and leftist backing in nationalizing the oil company, most of
the clergy (a few had cooperated with the left), the bazaaris, and a
large number of the population supported the Shah in regaining power by
a coup in 1953.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), also assisted in

this coup (Preece 1979, 39-41;

Rubin 1980, 54-90).

Returning from exile in Rome to reassume the throne, the Shah made
a religious gesture.

He detoured through Iraq and had his picture

taken, "leaning on the tomb of Ali, patron saint of the Shiites"
(Kapuscinski 1985, 40).

Mossadeq was sent to spend the last ten years

of his life under house arrest.

The regime refrained from stronger

measures to avoid creating another martyr.

At he same time, from 1953

to 1963, the economic situation in Iran continued to deteriorate.

A

consortium of Western companies, although paying higher prices to Iran
for oil than before, exploited the oil fields.

Corruption and

incompetence drained the country's revenues and resources.

In the

absence of banks, businessmen felt forced to borrow money from bazaaris
at prohibitive interest rates.

Unemployment increased.

estate speculations contributed to the general malaise.
class struggled for power with the feudal landowners.
political unrest grew (Hoveyda 1980, 131).

Unhealthy real
A new, rich
Social and

In the context of these

events, the ulama increasingly gained self assurance, led by the
moderate Ayatollah Burujirdi, a marja-i taqlid (source of imitation and
supreme authority on law of the Shi'a).

Burujirdi, in a meeting with
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the clerics in 1949, had urged their withdrawel from politics.

He had

cooperated with the monarchy, particularly during the recovery period
after World War II, to facilitate stability (Fischer in Esposito 1983,
153).

From his death, in March 1961 on, the relationship between the

ulama and the regime would deteriorate, however, below the level it had
been under Reza Shah, and erupt into the religious uprising and the
subsequent bloody counter-revolution in 1963.

THE THREAT SYSTEM TAKES CENTER STAGE

In the meantime, the removal of Mossadeq, and continuing
disintegration, ushered in a harsher dictatorship under the Shah.

His

efforts to insure stability and progress, however, only led to growing
distance between him and the majority of the population.
included the following:

His measures

1) the establishment of National Intelligence

and Security Organization (Sazeman Ettelat va Amniyat Kashvar) SAVAK in
1957;

2) the land reform bill of 1959, ratified in 1960;

and 3) the

White Revolution of 1963.
In 1957 under the guidance of United States and Israeli
intelligence officers the Shah established SAVAK (Area Handbook of Iran
1978, 367-74).
control."

It "quickly developed into a strong arm of government

It employed an estimated 10,000 full time personnel, and

200,000 informants (Butler qtd.

in Area Handbook of Iran 1978, 373).

Eventually, the Shah assigned SAVAK to his trusted childhood friend and
classmate, General Nassiri (executed in 1979) (Rubin 1980, 83).
agency became widely reputed for its brutality.

The

Originally, SAVAK

directed its main force of oppression against the outlawed left-wing
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Tudeh party.

It soon branched out into "press censorship and control of

intellectual expression."
controlled the news media.

Through it, by 1977, the government
Citizens were in danger of being arrested

for owning literature considered subversive by the government.

Iranian

authors found to be writing such literature faced police harassment and
possible imprisonment, torture or exile.^

The censorship in Iran had always been both brutal
and stupid. These two adjectives are applicable
even now, despite the co-option of many former
intellectuals into the ranks of government censors.
In the old times, if a poet composed anything
against the established ruler of the city, the
society, the country, he would be forced to lick the
ink of the pages of his poem. But this was very
minor punishment.... During the present Shah's
reign dozens of writers have been liquidated:...
(Baraheni 1977, 115-16).
Baraheni provides a long list of names of writers and other
intellectuals who have perished under the current regime.

He further

observes this:

The aims of censorship are too evident to be
discussed in this short note. But it is of the same
caliber that the Ministry of Arts and Culture is
trying to implement for the theater. A play is
sifted through in such a fashion that it doesn't
hurt or touch anymore. (Literature, religion,
traditions, underprivileged classes of the society
are not to be discussed.) Now the publication of
books is subjected to the same rule (Baraheni 1977,
119-20).
Moreover, SAVAK constantly scrutinized "potential trouble spots,"
such as labor unions, peasant organizations, student groups, and even
mosques.

The agency was "a law onto itself, having legal authority to
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arrest and detain suspected persons almost indefinitely.
its own prisons....

SAVAK operated

There was no institutional check, with the

exception of the Shah in these activities" (Area Handbook of Iran 1978,
372-74).
informers.

To be released, prisoners often had to agree to become
"Of the fourteen people I met in prison cells during my

imprisonment in 1973, at least two had been asked to become members of
SAVAK, and upon refusal they had been tortured" (Baraheni 1977, 8).
Because of the importance of the extended family network in Iran, with
every person arrested, SAVAK gained "one hundred bitter enemies from
among his relations" (Rubin 1980, 177).

In coming years SAVAK was also

said to have tortured clerics who spoke out against the abuse of power.
Ayatollah Saidi died during torture, and soon after him, Ayatollah
Azarshari. Ayatollah Teleghani (1910-1979) emerged from five years of
imprisonment without eyelids and with only a short time to live.

SAVAK

agents were said to have burned his eyelids with cigarettes when he
closed them to avoid having to watch his daughter being raped by SAVAK
(Kapuscinski 1985, 76-7).
mysteriously.

In 1977, Khomeini's older son died

SAVAK received the blame (Algar in Khomeini 1981, 19).

As the citizens became increasingly intimidated people actually tried to
avoid utterances in private conversation that could have been taken as
criticism of the regime, such as "oppresiveness, darkness, burden,
abyss, collapse, cage, bars, chain, wither away," among others
(Kapuscinski 1985, 44).

SAVAK was the Shah's "eyes and ears, and where

necessary, his iron fist" (Graham 1979, 143).

Baraheni asserts there

have been days on which SAVAK agents kidnapped up to 5,000 people.

An

American Embassy official told teachers at the Iran-America Society,
operated by the United States, to expect at least one SAVAK informer in
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each classroom--the same held for Iranian universities.

One instructor

reported that he mentioned the Shah "'just to get a reaction.'" To his
amazement, no one even "batted an eyelash."

They were too "paralyzed

with fear" at the mere mention of his name (Rubin 1980, 178-9).

The existing system meant that the entire population
was subjected to a constant all-pervasive terror.
While most secret police operations concentrate on
finding their government's most active enemies SAVAK
went out of its way to punish those suspected of the
most petty offenses. The broad nature of SAVAK's
intimidation and the surety of its blow was a
constant psychological humiliation for almost every
Iranian. The result was a deep desire for vengeance
on the part of the Shah's subjects (Rubin 1980,
178) .
Iranians were in jeopardy even abroad.

"Everything I said during my

stay in the United States in the academic year of 1972-1973, before my
imprisonment, had been reported to SAVAK, which operates on a global
scale" (Baraheni 1977, 8).
Then, the year 1959 introduced another period of confrontation
between the clergy and the regime.

One of the major issues during this
g

crisis was the land reform bill of 1959, ratified in 1960.
Because landowners had been blamed for all kinds of social evils--the
bill was supposed to proportion land more "fairly" among the population.
The bill, considered "illconceived" by many, and "contrary to Islam" and
to the shari'a, limited the amount of land anyone could hold (Lambton in
Yar-Shater 1971, 16).

Because of intense opposition to the

bill--including the voice of Ayatollah Burujirdi, who spoke for many
landowners--the bill remained inoperative.

Open opposition of the

clergy to the land reform bill signalled a change in the tactical
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alliance of two groups with fundamentally different perspectives (Akahvi
1980, 92).

In March 1961 Ayatollah Burujirdi died.

In May 1961, the

Shah dissolved the Majlis, and decreed that strong rule had to replace
the ineffective previous government.

In November 1961, he ordered the

government to implement the land law of May 1960.

"The resulting rule

by royal decree amounted to autocracy" (Akhavi 1980, 94).
approved a new version of the bill in January 1962.

The cabinet

Meanwhile, the

Shi1a, left leaderless and stunned with the death of Burujirdi, found
themselves unable to react in concert to the latest measures of the
regime.

The mujtahids also feared government interference in the

process of selecting a successor (Akhavi 1980, 99-100).
Because of the methods proposed by the bill, the economic position
of the majority of the peasants worsened within a few years.

Moreover,

land reform upset the social organization with its complex network of
exchange--that tied into religious institutions, and thus assaulted the
integrative system concretely.

It therefore upset "role structures with

a communications network uniting the occupants of these roles." And it
disturbed people and artifacts, "bound together by a network of inputs
and outputs of energy and information, or objects" (Boulding 1970, 22;
his definition of social organization). Land reform not only affected
waqf properties--it also extended Tehran's control over the country
side.

As Hooglund notes:

The real significance of the land reform lay not in
its distribution of agricultural property, but
rather in its role as a symbol of determination of
the Shah's government to intervene in rural affairs
(1982, 123).
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The Pahlavis continued to be

one of the largest landowning

families.

The Shah's brother Abul Reza

was nicknamed "'Iran's number

one farmer.'"

Mohammed Reza himself

owned a large commercial farm.

had interests in similar entrprises

Other

relatives

(Abrahamian 1982, 437).

In the wake of land reform, riots broke out, beginning at the
University of Tehran,

and involving the resurgent National Front. They

protested the illegal

suspension of parliament.

The clergy also

challenged the regime, besides land reform, they reacted to two
additional developments:

1)

the growing autocracy of the Shah;

corruption of the regime (Akhavi

and 2)

1980, 95).

In January 1963, the Shah inaugurated the six point program of the
"White Revolution."

Besides comprehensive land reform, the six point

program included the following changes:
forests and pastures;

1) the nationalization of

2) public sale of state-owned factories as

security for land reform;

3) worker's profit sharing in industry;

amendment of the electoral law and franchise for women;
formation of Literacy Corps (Saikal 1980, 82).

4)

and 5)

The program, supposed to

reshape the political, social and econoimc life of Iran, was approved
under autocratic conditions to give the appearance of popular approval.
Many Iranians perceived the measures "as being imposed on the country by
the United States and designed to bring about augmentation of the Shah's
power and wealth, as well as intensification of United States
dominance,.."

(Algar in Khomeini 1981, 16).

In March 1963, the Shah

distributed land reform deeds in Qum, in the face of hostility of the
ulama.

In a speech there, he branded them "'100 times more treacherous

than the Tudeh.'" And charged, "'the black reactionaries' and
'destructive red elements' will not sit quietly.

They cannot see the
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implementation of the six bills which insure the prosperity and glory of
Iran and make it an advanced Modern Iran..."(qtd.

in Zonis 1971, 75).

When seminary students demonstrated publicly--police occupied madrasas,
mosques and shrines.

Some of the students died when police threw them

into the dry riverbed from the roof of Faisiyeh madrasa.

Then, on April

1, 1963, speaking in Mashad, the monarch called the ulama "'a hindrance
to the progress of the country,'" and advised them to stay out of
politics (In Floor 1980, 513).

In this context, Khomeini became the

voice of the opposition against the Shah's measures.

He became the

first religious leader to frontally attack the Shah.

The very steps

taken by the Shah in search of stability and authority, namely:
strengthening ties with the United States;
suppressing the National Front;

1)

2) establishing SAVAK;

3)

4) inaugurating the White Revolution;

and 5) to a large extent, suppressing religious opposition, vulnerable
because of lack of leadership since the death of Ayatollah Burujirdi,
only reflected growing distance.

IN THE FACE OF CONTINUED THREAT:
KHOMEINI--THE VOICE OF THE OPPOSITION--THE PROMISE OF SECURITY

Out of the prevailing sense of insecurity and uncertainty, basic to
the "threat of being at issue," Khomeini emerged as central figure,
offering a vision of the future based on "Holy Law."

Born in 1902, in

Khomein, Khomeini, the son and grandson of religious scholars, went to
Iraq for religious studies at the age of seventeen, and became the pupil
of Shaykh Iraqi, a close associate of Shaykh Nuri who had been a
spokesman for the mujtahids during the Constitutional Revolution
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(1905-1911) (Fischer in Esposito 1983, 151).
himself to the circle of Shaykh Ha'iri.
following Ha'iri there.

Later, Khomeini attached

He settled on Qum in 1922,

The arrival of Ha'iri in Qum elevated it to the

spiritual capital of Islamic Iran.

Soon Khomeini became a popular

teacher at one of the madrasas. His major assertions include that
educated religious figures are representatives of the Imam until his
return.

Civil authority is "invalid" and "illegitimate."

Although part

of the passive opposition to the Pahlavi regime during the 1940s and
1950s, Khomeini politically followed Burujirdi--who had replaced Ha'iri
after his death in 1937, as spiritual leader of the faithful (Algar in
Khomeini 1981, 15;

Fischer in Esposito 1983, 152).

Both, Burujirdi and

Khomeini denounced the leading role in government during the Mossadeq
interlude of well known religious figure Ayatollah Kashani. Kashani was
"a fierce nationalist and political leader who broke with Mossadeq and
implicitly supported the Shah.

[He] challenged the government, however,

when in 1954 Iran normalized its relations with the United Kingdom"
(Floor 1980, 503).

Burujirdi and Khomeini accused him of having left

huge financial debts.
in Iran.

Under his influence, oil had become nationalized

Khomeini argued, Kashani should have been more concerned with

Islam than with oil.
It was rumored that Khomeini had broken with Burujirdi just before
the latter's death in 1961.

To this extent, Burujirdi had allegedly

warned, "'Do not follow Ruhullah, lest you find yourselves knee deep in
blood'" (qtd.

in Fischer, in Esposito 1983, 153).

Whatever had

transpired, Khomeini became less restrained in his criticism of civil
authority after the death of Ayatollah Burujirdi.
In 1962, Khomeini led the opposition to the enfranchisement of
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women, to the local council election bill (considered rigged elections,
as explained earlier) and to land reform.

He argued that land reform

was contrary to Islam which guaranteed the sanctity of private property.
In early 1963, Khomeini led the opposition to the White Revolution and
generally, to the modernization program perceived as political,
cultural, and economic subordination to the West (Fischer in Esposito
1983, 153).
Against this backdrop, the activists among the ulama urged
Khomeini, their emergent leader, to defend Islam, reminding him that
under the circumstances, it was his duty to comply.

Ayatollah Milani,

in a widely publicized letter expressed his concerns in this way, ”...
religious and national interests are threatened and violated by the
corrupt Ruling Body....

It would be strange for a Moslem to allow

himself to remain silent under such circumstances and fail to defend
Islam" (qtd.

in Zonis 1971, 45).

Under the circumstances of 1963, Khomeini declared the end of
taqiyya (dissimulation) (Heikal 1981, 85).

He became recognized as one

of seven marja-i taqlid (Fischer in Esposito 1983, 153).

He called the

mullahs to join him, or they would clearly "have chosen to side with
Satan."

Meanwhile he kept Moslem leaders in other countries informed of

his version of the proceedings (Algar in Keddie 1972, 244-55;
1980;

Heikal 1981, 85-91;

Stempel 1981;

Fischer

Wilber 1981, 332-33).

On the fortieth day of the anniversary of the killing of students
of Faisiyeh Seminary in Qum by paratroopers in March 1963, Khomeini gave
9
a rhetorically powerful speech. In it, he drew parallels between
recent events and the killings and desecration of the shrine of Imam
Reza in Mashad by soldiers under Reza Shah in 1935.

They had fired upon
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protesters against Western dress codes and against general conditions of
tyranny.

He asserted, the regime was destroying the "ordinances of

Islam for the sake of oil and Israel."

And also, "that it was

attempting to place the affairs of Muslims in the hands of 'Jews,
Christians and the enemies of Islam1" (Fischer in Esposito 1983,
154).^ Khomeini's pictures adorned the bazaars of Iran, "as
symbol of the type of opposition to illegitimate authority offered by
Hossein..."

(Zonis 1971, 45).

Continuing his attacks on the

government, he delivered another powerful speech on the tenth of
Muharram (3 June 1963), the most intense day of mourning of the Shi'i
ritual calendar.

He used "demagogic rhetoric" characterizing events in

villainous terms, invoking the Karbala symbolism.

As Klapp postulates,

projecting distress onto "Satan," or an "oppressor," allows for renewed
integration, and for the "closing of the system."

Villain images

facilitate this process --because they embody anxiety in personal form,
serving as focus for hostility (Klapp 1978, 83-94).

In terms of

"boundary maintenance" they reestablish cohesion in communities in the
face of threat to solidarity (Erikson 1966).

Khomeini's speech included

other language that has special symbolic meaning for believers, like the
term zulm, referring to hurt, oppression, injustice, and taqut, denoting
tyrannical earthly power.

In the context of the happenings of 1963,

these terms express "an existential, almost cosmic, situation which at
certain times sheds its vague truth value and becomes an exact
description of contemporary events" (Fischer 1980, 7).

Thus,

"[Khomeini] began with a rawzeh, a rhetorical form, normally occurring
at the end rather than the beginning of a sermon or preachment which
elicits weeping and is intended to instill in listeners a stoical
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determination to re-dedicate themselves to the principles of Islam no
matter what the odds and external pressures:"

I seek refuge in Allah from the pursuing Satan. In
the name of God, the most merciful, the most
compasionate. It is now the evening of Ashura.
Sometimes when I review the events of Ashura, I
confront this question: If the Ummayyids and Yezid,
the son of Moaviyeh, were waging war only with
Husain, why then the savage, inhuman behavior
towards helpless women and the innocent children of
Husain? What had the women and children done? What
had the six month old baby of Husain done? [The
audience cries.] I think they wanted to destroy the
foundation [of the family of the Prophet]. The
Umayyids and the regime of Yezid were against the
family of the Prophet. They did not want the Bani
Hashem to exist and they wanted to uproot the sacred
[family] tree.
Khomeini made explicit the metaphor of the arch-tyrant and destroyer of
Islam, Yazid, standing in for the Shah:

I ask the same question here: If the brutal regime
of Iran is engaged in a war with the ulama, why did
it tear the Quran apart while attacking Faisiyeh
Seminary?
What did it
have against
theFaisiyeh
Seminary?
What did it
have against
thestudentsof
theology?
What did it
have against
theeighteen
year old sayyid [Sayyid Younes Rudbari who had been
killed in the March assault]? [The audience cries.]
What had the eighteen year old sayyid done to the
Shah? What had he done aginst the government? What
had he done against the brutal regime of Iran? [The
audience cries.] Therefore we must conclude that it
wanted to do away with the foundation.
It is
against the foundation of Islam and the clergy. It
does not want this foundation to exist. It does not
want our youth and elders to exist.
He expressed anger at Israel, to him the root of all satanic evil, and
at the Shah's charge that the clergy are parasites.
rich parasites:

He considers the
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I advise you Mr. Shah, Shah sir, I advise you to
change your ways. If one day our masters decide you
should go, I would not want the people to have cause
to celebrate your departure. I do not wish for you
the same destiny as your father.... God knows that
the people rejoiced when Pahlavi left.... Listen to
the advice of the clergy.... Do not listen to
Israel.... I hope when you said the reactionaries
are impure animals, you were not referring to the
clergy. Otherwise our duty will be most onerous and
you will have a difficult time. You will not be
able to live. The people will not let you continue.
Are Islam and the clergy black reactionaries? But
you black reactionary, you have created this white
revolution. For what is this white revolution?
Khomeini also counter-threatened when he heard that a group of clergy
were detained in Tehran by the secret police, threatened and forced to
promise they would refrain from talking against the Shah and against
Israel, and from charging that Islam is in danger.
for all of the crimes SAVAK committed;
the Shah (Khomeini 1981, 218).

He blamed the Shah

because SAVAK killed by order of

He concluded:

Our country, our Islam is in danger. What is
happening, and what is about to happen worries and
saddens us. We are worried and saddened by the
situation of this ruined country. We hope to God
that things can be reformed (Fischer in Esposito
1983, 154-158).
Early the next morning, on June 4, 1963, he was arrested, during
the emotional period of Muharram.

In the wake of his arrest, "a day of

infamy," occurred on June 5 (15 Khordad). During intense demonstrations
in Iran, the army massacred thousands.

"...an event symbolized in

popular memory with the image of thousands of black-shirted marchers
enroute from Qum to Tehran being strafed by air force planes" (Fischer
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1980, 188).

The government succeeded in suppressing the riots and

imposed martial law.

The regime rounded up opposition leaders, 250 in

the last four months of 1963.
(Fischer 1980, 188).

Arrests continued for the next two years

(The international press began reporting tortures

in Iran consistenly from 1965 on.)

Top ranking clergy saved Khomeini

from execution by elevating him to ayatollah al-uzma, the highest rank
of clergy.

He was thus protected by the constitution of 1905-1906--and

the government heeded notice that his execution would evoke serious
consequences.

Released to Qum after two months, on August 3, 1963, he

announced that he would not be intimidated, expressed in the Koranic
verse, "'From God we come and unto Him we shall return,'" with which he
began his rawzeh.

He elicited much crying.

In October 1963, just

before the election of a new parliament replacing the one the Shah had
dissolved in May 1961, SAVAK agents seized Khomeini from his home.

He

was said to have ordered his followers to boycott the vote because of
government interference in the elections (Zonis 1971, 46).

In October

1964 the majlis passed a bill accepting a $200 million loan from the
United States for the purchase of military equipment.

The law included

a stipulation granting immunity from Iranian law to American military
personnel, thus extending rights of extraterritoriality reserved for
diplomats to many individuals outside of the embassy staff (Beeman in
Keddie 1983, 209).

Khomeini declared the agreement with the United

States "'a document for the enslavement of Iran'" (Algar in Keddie 1972,
246-47).

He asserted further:
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If any of them commits a crime in Iran, they are
immune. If an American servant or cook terrorizes
your source of religious authority in the middle of
the bazaar, the Iranian police does not have the
right to stop him. The Iranian courts cannot put
him on trial or interrogate him. He should go to
America where the masters would decide what to
do.... We do not consider this government a
government. These are traitors. They are traitors
to the country (qtd. in Ismael 1980, 610).
Never offically charged with any wrongdoing and never brought to
trial, the regime exiled Khomeini to Turkey on November 4, 1964, and
later allowed him to move to the Shi'i stronghold of Najaf, in Iraq.

He

lived there for the next fifteen years, and served as marja-i taqlid to
his followers.

He continued to send tape-recorded speeches, messages

and writings to Iran.
Iranian students abroad who were members of the Third National
Front, a faction of the original National Front, expressed their views
on the recent developments in Iran.

In their Newsletter (Kharbanameh),

they published the following article entitled "'The Lessons of 1963'":

During Muharram 1963, it was the religious leaders
and not the political parties that inspired and
encouraged the masses. The major lesson to be drawn
from 1963 is that the 'ulama have a crucial role to
play in our antiimperialist struggle--just as they
did in the tobacco crisis of 1891-1892, in the
constitutional revolution of 1905-1911, and in the
nationalist movement of 1950-1953 (qtd. in
Abrahamian 1982, 461).

58

EVENTS CONTRIBUTING TO THE GROWING GULF--OUT OF THE VOID EMERGES
KHOMEINI--THE VOICE OF COUNTER-THREAT IN THE NAME OF ISLAM

According to Fischer, Khomeini began formulating "a justification
for maximalist control of the clergy in the political sphere," only from
1970-1971 onward, thus abandoning his efforts to merely reform the Shah
(In Esposito 1983, 163).

The following passage from Khomeini's book

Islamic Government, based on a series of lectures given at Najaf between
January 21 and February 8, 1970, exemplifies this trend:

In order to assure the unity of the Islamic umma, in
order to liberate the Islamic homeland from
occupation and penetration by the imperialists and
their puppet governments, it is imperative that we
establish a government. In order to attain the
unity and freedom of the Muslim peoples, we must
overthrow the oppressive governments installed by
the imperialists and bring into existence an Islamic
government of Justice that will be in the service of
the people. The formation of such a government will
serve to preserve the disciplined unity of the
Muslims; just as Fatimat az-Zahra (upon whom may be
peace) said in his address: 'The Imamate exists for
the sake of preserving order among the Muslims and
replacing their disunity with unity' (1981, 49).
He offers further, one establishes an Islamic Government "with
persuasion (tabliqat) by creating enough like minded people to have the
power to struggle..."

(Fischer 1980, 153).

Meanwhile, from 1964 to 1975 the Shah added another eleven points
to his White Revolution program (see Glossary).
he saw land reform as an essential measure.

To realize his goals,

Through other changes he

tried to assure a regulated and equal relationship between employer and
employee, assure women's equality, eliminate illiteracy and disease, end
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"backwardness" in the villages, connect the outer regions to the rest of
the nation, and establish general conditions of harmony in the context
of "today's civilized world" (Pahlavi 1980, 101).

Pondering some of the

innovations in retrospect, a "candid" city planner offered this view of
Qum in 1975, several years after land reform:

After land reform, agriculture declined because the
new small holders did not have the money to keep up
the water supplies. Therefore there was a great
influx of people into town.., and this together with
the growth of industry led to a boom land situation.
A number of big shots seized land and just began
selling it without concern for hospitals, parks, or
other needs. A proper road system was not laid oUt,
and so we have roads that just end, and all traffic
is funneled through the center of town. A number of
obvious things have to be done: complete the road
pattern so there can be circulation; build a bus
terminal on the Tehran road; create parking
facilities for visitors to the shrine; map out a
proper land-use zoning system. (qtd. in Fischer
1980, 123).
By the time the masterplan for Qum, drawn in 1975, had travelled through
the state bureaucracy of Tehran, much of the construction had already
been completed.

Similar projects were under way throughout Iran

(Fischer 1980, 123).

Land reform and some of the other changes left

three distinct groups in the countryside by the early 1970s, namely:

1)

absentee farmers, including the royal family, religious foundations,
agrobusiness, and old-time landlords who had found loopholes allowing
them to keep large parcels of land;

2) independent farmers? consisting

of former peasant proprietors, and about 1,638,000 families that had
benefited from land reform;

and 3) rural wage earners bypassed by land

reform and former nomads whose migratory routes had been cut off
(Abrahamian 1982, 429-30).
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Also in the early 1970s, urban areas experienced a "minor
industrial revolution."

The urban population grew from 38 percent in

1966 to 48 percent in 1976, following the growth of new schools, health
facilities and industrial plants, located mostly in cities.
mortality dropped--and the rank of children increased.

Infant

"By the

mid-1970s, half the population was under sixteen years of age and
two-thirds under thirty" (Abrahamian 1982, 431).
While the Shah strove to modernize the socioeconomic structure--he
neglected to develop the political system:

[to permit] the formation of pressure groups, open
political arena for various social forces, forge
links between the regime and the old classes, and
broaden the social base of the monarchy that, after
all, had survived mainly because of the 1953
military coup d'etat. Instead of modernizing the
political system, the shah, like his father, based
his power on the three Pahlevi pillars: the armed
forces, the court patronage network, and the vast
state bureaucracy (Abrahamian 1982, 435).
That is to say, in considering the military establishment his central
support, the monarch continually increased its size and took a major
interest in the well-being of his officers.

He supervised their

training, participated in their military maneuvers, offered them
generous salaries and pensions, state of the art medical facilities,
attractive housing, and an array of fringe benefits.
supervised all promotions above the rank of major.

He also personally
In addition, the

court patronage network consisted of members of the royal family, and of
close personal friends.

They received lucrative salaries, pensions, and

sinecures in exchange for services rendered.

And lastly, the state

bureaucracy continually grew, from 12 ministries with about 150,000
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civil servants in 1963, to 19 ministries and over 304,000 civil servants
in 1977.

This proliferation permitted the state "to penetrate more

deeply" into the life of the ordinary citizen (Abrahamian 1982, 435-9).
At the same time, the monarch strove to establish his legitimacy
and authority with several grand, national celebrations.

In 1965, he

celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of his reign and acquired the
title Aryamehr or Light of the Aryans.

In 1967 came his elaborate

coronation ceremony during which he proclaimed himself Shahinsha (King
of Kings), and his wife Farah, to be Empress.

In a speech during this

occasion, he asserted he had crowned himself "'because now the Iranian
people are living in prosperity and security.

I long ago promised

myself that I would never be king over a people who were beggars and
oppressed'" (Quoted in Heikal 1981, 93).

And, as F.

Hoveyda, the

Shah's Ambassador to the United States, and brother of Amir Abbas
Hoveyda, Prime Minister under the Shah (executed April 7, 1979) asserts:

That he was determined to have crowned himself is
understandable. That he should have waited for
twenty six years before doing it can also be
accepted. He himself put forward an apparently
logical explanation: that he had waited for his
people's standard of living to improve. Was that
not a form of legitimation? The coronation followed
as a consequence of services rendered, because the
people recognized what might be called the utility
of the sovereign, and so offered him the crown.
Actually he could then have created a new line
rooted in tradition: to have the crown given to him
by a representative of the people, and not to take
it himself. A true leader should be chosen or
elected (1980, 123).
In 1969 came the twentieth anniversary of his reign.

Then during

the splendid Persepolis affair in 1971, celebrating the 2,500th
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anniversary of the monarchy, and attended by hundreds of foreign heads
of state, the Shah tried to link his monarchy to the Persian Empire of
Cyrus the Great, and asserted Aryan roots.

In the eyes of the Shi1a,

this connection to historical, pre-Islamic, pagan roots only widened the
gulf between the monarch and the believers --because it further
emphasized differentiation between religious and secular roots--and
because the Persian Empire had enjoyed close connections with Judaism
(Hoveyda 1980, 12--32;

Heikal 1981, 83).^ Baraheni relates that

television covered the event.

It took place under an "encampment of

luxurious tents--all made in Europe and flown along with thousand of
other items via Tehran and Shiraz to the Persepolis" (1977, 101).
Thousands of Iranians watched as the Shah, followed by celebrities,
walked to the Passargade where the tomb of King Cyrus is located.
heard him say, "'Cyrus!
100).

They

You rest in peace, I am awake’1' (Baraheni 1977,

The Pahlavi dynasty seemed to strive "to circumvent Islam in the

definition of the Iranian State" (Beeman in Keddie 1983, 210).
violent reaction, Khomeini charged:

The shameful, bloody, so-called White Revolution,
which in a single day caused fifteen thousand
Muslims to be killed by tanks and machine guns, has
made the fate of our people still bleaker and darker
and worsened the life of the enslaved peasantry. In
many of our cities and most villages, clinics,
doctors, and medicines are not to be found. There
is no trace of schools, bathhouses, or clean
drinking water. As some newspapers admit, the poor
children are so hungry that they go to graze in the
fields. Yet the tyrannical regime spends hundreds
of millions of tumans of the country's wealth on
various shameful "festivals": the birthday of this
or that person, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the
accession to the throne, the coronation, and worst
and most catastropic of all, the vile festival of

In
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the twenty-five hundreds anniversary of the monarchy
(qtd. in Khomeini 1981, 198).
In a declaration issued from Najaf, Khomeini encouraged "the oppressed
people of Iran" to send letters and telegrams in open protest of the
celebrations to the government of Iran, and to let their voices "be
heard throughout the world."

He warned, that if the ulama of all major

Iranian cities banned together and protested collectively, including the
more than 150,000 students and scholars of religious sciences, these
"authorities, proofs of Islam and ayatullahs"--they would achieve their
aims and overthrow the government (Khomeini 1981, 205-208).

He further

declared this:

The people of Islam should mourn the usurpation of
rule from 'Ali (upon whom be peace) and commemorate
those few years when he was the blessed embodiment
of Islamic rule. They should commemorate his
justice, the fact that he was part of his people,
that his standard of living was lower than that of
others while his spirit rose ever higher above the
horizons. One should commemorate a ruler who, when
he hears that an anklet has been stolen from a
non-Muslim woman living under the protection of
Islam, wishes to die of shame; who, when he thinks
that someone may be going hungry in his realm,
suffers hunger voluntarily himself. One should
commemorate a rule that uses the sword to protect
his people and protect them from fear. But as for a
regime founded on oppression and thievery whose only
aim is to satisfy its own lustful desires--only when
it is overthrown can the people celebrate and
rejoice.... 'As for those who disbelieve, they
engage in pleasure and in eating as the beasts, and
the fire shall be their abode' (Qur'an 47:12). One
who eats and takes his pleasure with no concern for
what is permitted or forbidden, for the manner in
which he has acquired his property, who pays no
attention to the condition of the people or to the
ordinances of the law--such a man lives like an
animal. A ruler who fits this description and
wishes to rule over the people and the nation in
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accordance with his carnal and
bestial desireswill
produce nothing but disaster. The people must mourn
the existence of such a government and weep over
their misfortune; to celebrate in such
circumstances would be totally senseless (qtd. in
Khomeini 1981, 200-01).
To worsen matters, also,
ceremony,

in 1971, the year of the Persepolis

the Shah considered creating a

Religion Corps.For one,

induction into the corps might serve as punitive measure for clerical
opponents to the regime, by drafting them into the army.

Drafting them

would remove them from their areas of activity and following.

For

another, state influence would thus penetrate into the
countryside--parallel to the Literacy Corps already operative in remote
villages since the White Revolution.

Members of the corpswould be more

difficult to reach by Khomeini--who responded in this way:

... the poisonous culture of imperialism is
penetrating to the depths of towns and villages
throughout the Muslim world, displacing the culture
of the Qur'an.... Invoking Islam and pretending to
be Muslims, they [the regime] strive to annihilate
Islam, as they abolish and obliterate the sacred
commands of the Qur'an one after the other (qtd. in
Algar in Keddie 1972, 253).
At the same time, consistent with Boulding's postulations, that
under threat conditions the ruling group is "cut-off from effective two
way communication"--the Shah became unresponsive to the needs, opinions,
and sentiments of many Iranians.

In the 1960s, in the face of fierce

opposition, the Shah had launched a program of drastic reforms,
discussed thus far, trying to catapult Iran into the twentieth century.
Along the way, he lost sight of it--became distant from the
population--increasingly alarming and alienating them.

The Nixon visit
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in 1972, and again, the jump in oil prices in 1973-1974, seemed to
exacerbate this condition (Hoveyda 1980, 148-50).
had little or no influence on policy decisions.

Information feedback
Ambassador Sullivan

noted in 1977-1978 that none of the Shah's advisors shared their honest
views with the monarch.

They would avoid discussing them even amongst

each other, and pretended always to agree with policy decisions, even
applauding them.

In private, however, they confessed their fears and

apprehensions to Sullivan, one by one (1981, 71).
Particularly from 1975-1976 onward, the Shah made "serious mistakes
in the conduct of the country's affairs" (Hoveyda 1980, 148-150).
"Communists" and "anarchists" received all the blame for any internal
problems the Shah acknowledged.

In the meantime, opponents of the

"repellent center," the Pahlavi political order, gradually united around
a "positive pole," Khomeini (Green 1982).

The organ of the exiled

Liberation Movement encouraged this consolidation already in 1972, in an
editorial on '"The Struggles of the Religious Leaders’":

The Shi'i leaders have always helped Iran’s struggle
against despotism and imperialism. Since the days
of the Constitutional Revolution, since the bleak
years of Reza Shah's repression, and since the
bloody demonstrations of 1963, the 'ulama have
allied themselves with the masses. Ayatollah
Khomeini, who has lived in exile since 1964, is now
the main opponent of the regime, and other national
traitors do their very best to drive a wedge between
us and the progressive religious leaders.... We
will do all we can to create unity between the
political opposition and the religious leaders,
especially Ayatollah Khomeini. United we will
destroy the hated regime (qtd. in Abrahamian 1982,
461-62).
Across the gulf, however, the monarch was living "in a fantasy world of
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his own creation," (Green 1982, 68).
"dangerously simplistic views."

His "blind confidence" centered on

Namely, financial means make everything

possible--and Iran's income will continue to grow indefinitely.

He

ignored all information signalling danger (Hoveyda 1980, 154).
For one, in the context of strained relations with the ulama and
their following, inflation because of high government spending,
breakdowns in planning, contraction of the oil markets, and
corruption--the Shah in 1975, embarked on an intense "antiprofiteering"
campaign.

In its wake, the government fined 10,000 merchants, arrested

7,500, and closed 600 shops.

The bazaar was one of the major targets

(Rubin 1980, 156).
For another, without warning, the Shah announced his plan to
establish a one party system in Iran.

...the Shahanshah, on March 2, 1975, announced the
establishment in Iran of a single party system. The
existing multi-party system he said, was being
abolished because there was no role for an
opposition party to play in a country where
programmes were being implemented in the interests
of the entire nation. The one party was also being
set up to permit all Iranians to rally round 'one
standard, one philosophy, one highly organized
apparatus to preserve the interests of Iran today
and tomorrow' (Green 1982, 54).
According to the Shah, it was essential for all Iranians to participate
in the political process and strive toward a common goal, namely, to
make Iran one of the foremost powers by the year 2000.

In this sense,

the party was a political instrument to mobilize the citizenry "into the
government-controlled mainstream of political life" (Area Handbook of
Iran 1978, 201).

Citizens registered to vote under pressure.

They were
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told, nonvoting indicated "'lack of party discipline.1" And further,
"'nonvoting is not only an act of treason against experimentation with
democracy, but also an escape from social and party responsibilities'"
(qtd.

in Mohammadi-Nejad 1977, 109).

Rumors arose that nonvoters would

be denied passports, would lose their jobs, and more.

Rastakhiz party

organs handed out leaflets that warned:

Those who will not join the Rastakhiz Party are
either traitors who belong in prison or people who
do not believe in the Shah, the Nation, and the
Homeland and thus ought not expect to be treated in
the same way as others (Kapuscinski 1985, 88).
Initial response to registration was cool.
people had registered to vote.

By May 23, 1975, 1/2 Million

With continual "prodding," by May 28,

registration had reached 1.5 Million.

Candidates handed out ballots

with their name on them before the election.

The Shahanshah had

succeeded once again in extending his control over the country.

Because

of the distance between him and the bulk of the population, however, he
was unaware at what tremendous cost he had "won."

REFLECTIONS OF DISTANCE

Considering recent developments in Iran, F.

Hoveyda (the brother

of Amir Abbas Hoveyda, Prime Minister under the Shah, and executed April
7, 1979) made this entry in his diary on February 9, 1975:

I resent nonparticipation to such a degree, that all
coherent thought deserts me.... Everything seems
bogus. Impression that we are all phantoms jostling
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about on the proscenium in front of an unreal stage.
The feeling of identification with a homeland in
progress which moved me once, is quickly fading. We
are actors in a tragicomedy with no certain outcome
(Hoveyda 1980, 102).
According to Zonis, "depoliticalization ensues from exclusion in the
political process and resembles "demoralization."

As a result, many

intellectuals withdraw sullenly, and participate in the economic life of
the state without enthusiasm.

In Iran, some such "co-depressed" met in

weekly circles (dowrehs), and commiserated (1971, 40-1).

Davud Ramzi,

an Iranian writer expresses their theme in his "Akharin Istgah" (The
Last Station):

High walls
Very high
As high as the world
I am surrounded
Foolishly I try to make a path
Dead ends everywhere
Every escape blocked
(In Bill 1972, 76).
In addition, some of the faculty of Tehran University, a haven for
depoliticized Iranians in the 1970s, openly spoke out against
governmental policies.

They saw the incursion of Western culture as so

extensive that it "robbed Eastern societies of their creative abilities"
and imposed "its own special pattern of life on all fields."

They

appealed to "young men and women to wake up to the perils of the present
trend and to realize that without the foundation of a national culture,
the trappings of Western culture can only lead to destruction of the
country" (Wilber 1981, 210).

Hoveyda wrote this to a friend in 1975:
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The big problem in Iran right now is not economic
but cultural. A cultural substructure is loosely
and imperfectly bound to a Western veneer that will
not hold. The country is heading for disaster. The
more the material side is assured, the more
metaphysical problems will grow (1980, 104).
As cities spread haphazardly, and automobiles clogged the streets, life
for many Iranians took on a more frantic pace.

Many peasant families,

despairing over being unable to support themselves from their land, sold
or abandoned their property, and migrated (Hooglund 1982, 121).
living patterns changed, as people became widely separated.

Family

Telephones

were supposed to fill the void created by less person to person contact.
Only those with time and money, however, could acquire the device.

In

addition, radios, cassette recorders, cars, and televisons became
considered necessities in Iranian life.

Even in villages without

running water or electricity, numerous television antennas dotted the
landscape, run by gasoline generators.

At the same time, in spite of

the Literacy Corps, only an estimated 37 percent of Iranians were
literate by 1977 (Area Handbook of Iran 1978, xi). Low budget,
melodrama-type films appeared in abundance, attracting the urban youth,
much to the dismay of the clergy.

Large numbers of Iranian students

went abroad to study at foreign universities.
studied in the United States alone by 1976.

About 33,000 of them
Upon their return to Iran,

they pursued life based on newly acquired attitudes toward traditionally
sensitive matters, such as male-female relations for example, upsetting
their elders.

They also realized that many of the specific skills

learned abroad had little to do with life in Iran.
translating them to fit Iranian requirements.

They had difficulty

"The problems of

developing a bazaar economy into an investment capital network were
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ill-served by American graduate-level econometrics" (Beeman in Keddie
1983, 209).

Returning young professionals and intellectuals often felt

alienated and useless.
abroad.

Some of them established permanent residences

Some stayed and tried to adjust.

Most, however, harbored a lingering feeling of
resentment against the United States and other
Western nations that had hosted them--not for
anything they had done to them, but for their
education, which was to be their salvation yet
became a hollow fulfillment of the promise it had
offered (Beeman in Keddie 1983, 209).
Bamdad exemplifies their dilemma as follows:

I am bothered by a pain
Which isn't mine.
I have lived in a land
Which isn't mine.
I have lived with a name
Which isn't mine.
I have wept of grief
Which isn't mine
I was born out of joy
Which isn't mine.
I die of a death
Which isn't mine
(In Arasteh 1970, 188).
A steadily growing upper-middle class began visiting Europe and the
United States each year in large numbers.

Many went simply on shopping

trips, using flights solidly booked most of the time by the mid-1970s.
Boutiques began to appear in Tehran and in other major cities, carrying
Western luxury items, and inviting shoppers to complete their Western
wardrobe.

Young Iranian children frequented summer camps in Switzerland

and toured many of the Western capitals, never having seen the classical
cities of Iran (Beeman in Keddie 1983, 206-211).
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For the bulk of the population the foreign
orientation of everything around them--television,
architecture, film, clothing, social attitudes,
educational goals, and economic development
aims--seemed to resemble a strange, alien growth on
the society that was sapping it of all its former
values and worth. Middle-aged people bemoaned the
crassness and bustle of modern life, and openly
longed for older, quieter times when life was harder
but stability reigned: where one could count on
other peoples attitudes and not expect to be
shocked, outraged, or disoriented every time one
went out of doors or read a newspaper (Beeman in
Keddie 1983, 209-10).
For the religious community the new social orientation was sinful.

They

attacked dancing, music, the cinema, and the consumption of liquor.

In

smaller towns, owners of radios would defend ownership by explaining
they were merely listening to news.

Television seemed to meet with

their approval more readily, and was endorsed even by Ayatollah
Khomeini, given proper supervision.
Moreover, in undermining the political influence of Shi'ism in
Iran, secularism had eroded the narrow bridge between the government and
the people, and thus intensified the aloofness, experienced as extreme
abrasiveness, of the political system toward the social system
(Abrahamian in Kedourie and Haim 1980, 99).

As some of the educated

classes argued, had the state been less repressive;

more creative and

instructive thought and action would have been possible, based on a
broader social base.

These intellectuals viewed much of the opposition

of the clergy as valid.

Although many of them "hated” Khomeini--they

supported his cause because they "hated" the Shah more (Green 1982, 87).
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They are both stubborn and vindictive. They both
advance simplistic ideas about the problems of their
country and the world. Neither brooks any
contradiction. Each considers himself guided by the
Almighty. They want to be undisputed leaders of the
people. Their dictatorial spirit knows no
bounds.... But, of course, they lead different
lives. Khomeini is an ascetic, while the Shah
compulsively surrounds himself with pomp and
ceremony (Hoveyda 1980, 21).
As covered earlier in the text, many of the intellectuals had been
critical of the Pahlavi regime--and a substantial number of them had
paid with their life for speaking out.
and torture.

The lucky ones survived prison

Some had tried to adjust, and some had just given up.

Their subsequent cooperation with the religious sector reflected the
amorphous desire for freedom from oppression and chaos, and for social
expression, political participation, and economic stability.
Seemingly oblivious to growing hostility, the Shah was quoted in
Kahan International, in 1976, as saying, "From the domestic viewpont,
fortunately, I have no worries" (Hoveyda 1980, 163).

And also in 1976,

in his book Towards the Great Civilization, the Shah asserts this:

I have guided my people along this wonderful path of
Destiny because I felt that only that path could
insure their dignity and happiness. Having an
absolute faith in this, it was my duty to set the
nation such a goal, not only as the person
responsible for its destiny, but also as the father,
guide, and friend of every Iranian (Hoveyda 1980,
152) .
In the same year, the Shah celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of
the dynasty.

And soon thereafter, "The last straw came in 1977, when

the sovereign altered the calendar to start not with Hegira but with the
foundation of the Persian Empire of Cyrus the Great" (Hoveyda 1980,
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In May 1977, 54 lawyers expressed the concerns of several other
professional classes by signing a declaration protesting judicial
changes that would have subordinated the judiciary to the executive.
Also in May, Khajahouri, a historian, criticized the Rastakhiz Party in
a letter for its failure to establish a dialogue with the people and the
government.

In June, members of the forbidden National Front sent an

open letter to the Shah, asking for
implementation of the constitution.

an end todictatorship and
In July,40 writers, in a written

document, called for "creative freedom and end to censorship."

Other

intellectuals asked for "end to despotic rule" in a signed letter.
Another group of lawyers spoke out against violation of the Constitution
(Preece 1979, 98-9).

The deaths of Tehran slum dwellers in August 1977,

and the assassination by SAVAK of Khomeini's older son in November 1977,
finally exploded the volatile climate (Algar in Khomeini 1981, 19).

In

October students demonstrated in Tehran, calling for the return of
Ayatollah Ruhallah Khomeini.

As demonstrations escalated into riots,

the Shah charged that the incidents were indicators of
"'counter-revolution, black reaction and outright treason'" (Preece
1979, 99).

According to the Shah, the rioters "desired to set the

country back 1,500 to 2,000 years."

As usual, he missed no opportunity

to express his hatred for Khomeini,

using thenewspaper as vehicle for

his attacks in 1978 (Fischer in Esposito 1983,

159-60).

Then, the

monarch visited President Carter in Washington, in November.
Demonstrations occurred in Tehran.

Carter returned the visit in

December and declared Iran "an island of stability" because of the
"great leadership of the Shah," and the "respect, admiration, and love"
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the Shah receives from his people.

In the meantime, of the various groups that coalesced around
Khomeini and that surfaced in 1978-1979, the Liberation Movement was to
play the most important role.

It was one of many groups affiliated with

the National Front, and enjoyed close ties with Khomeini.

Because of

the leadership of Bazargan and Taleqani, the Movement was able to
attract "young professionals and technocrats, who, although moderneducated, sought to synthesize Islam and Western science" (Abrahamian
1982, 464).
Shariati.

The most outstanding of those was the sociologist Ali
(He died under mysterious circumstances on 19 June 1977, in

England, after several years of inprisonment in Iran.

SAVAK seemed

implicated in his death) (Akhavi in Keddie 1983, 127).
organizations included the following:

Other

1) the Feda'i, known under this

name since 1971, but established in 1963 by five Tehran University
students, wanting to destroy the repressive "atmosphere," and prove to
the masses that only armed struggle leads to liberation;

and 2) the

Mujahedin, founded in 1965 by six recent graduates of Tehran University,
evolved from the religious wing of the National Front, unlike the Feda'i
who had Marxist leanings.

The Mujadin eventually separated into a

religious and a Marxist wing.

Based on statistics of dead guerrillas,

most of their membership had come from the young intelligentsia.

All of

the groups had been underground organizations who had labored in vain to
bring down the regime.

During the revolutionary upsurge in late 1977,

they were prepared to take advantage of the situation.

Moreover, after

the release of many political prisoners in 1978, thanks to President
Carter's human rights campaign, their ranks swelled in numbers
(Abrahamian 1982, 462-95).

As Algar noted, moreover, when the
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revolution finally came, it was a movement without organized membership.
Rather, Khomeini issued directives throughout Iran and realized
immediate massive support of the overwhelming majority of Iranians.

...As for what we call in broad terms the
[revolutionary] movement, people should not be under
the illusion that this is a question of a formally
organised movement with membership criteria, and so
forth... it was a broad-based Islamic movement and
not some kind of affair in which people sit down, as
an examining body, and decide who is worthy to be
admitted. What is necessary is to recruit, in an
informal fashion, the massive support of the
overwhelming majority of the people.... This is what
happened in Iran. It is not that a secret party or
organization was set up which brought more and more
people into the fold....The Revolution was genuinely
a people's movement. One can say that the Islamic
Revolution in Iran was an example of mass political
participation and is unique in modern times (Algar
in Siddiqui 1980, 65).
The Shah, at the same time, expressed his view of the state of
affairs in these words:

No profound change can come about in our country
outside the framework of the monarchic order. The
monarchic regime as soul, essence, existence, source
of energy and foundation of the national sovereignty
and unity constitutes the solid basis of the great
civilization and the strong custodian of all its
values, its progress and its material and moral
gains. This regime will guide and protect the
destiny of the Iranian people in the most brilliant
period in their history....The participation of the
people in all the country's affairs, and the
government of the people by the people, are now
reality at every level of social life. The Iranian
people freely elect their representatives to the
cooperatives, village councils, local tribunals,
town and district assemblies and arbitration
councils. And at a higher level the people
participate directly in the elections to the
Rastakhiz party and in sending representatives to
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the town chambers of Parliament. They also enjoy
full freedom of expression through various party
organs as well as through the press and information
media, as a genuine democracy demands (Hoveyda 1980,
151-152).
In the Shah's own words, his aim had always been to assure "health,
food, clothing, housing and education for all" (Pahlavi 1980, 101).

The

Shah's method, however, involved heavy Western, particularly American
influence, which included the building of a vast military machinery
under their guidance, oppression, and a great number of highly visible
"immorally" behaving friends and relatives.

Between 1971 and 1978,

purchases of arms from the United States reached $19 billion (Hoveyda
1980, 98).

Hoveyda further observed this in relation to the Shah:

Looking back with hindsight I now feel that his
greatest weakness lay in his relations with his
family and friends. His brothers and sisters,
nephews and nieces, brothers- and sisters -in-law
often did just as they pleased, and their friends'
behavior could not fail to damage the monarchy, but
the Shah always forgave the members of his family
and his immediate entourage. Furthermore, though he
was feared by all his top civil servants and
high-ranking officers, he did not dare to lay down
the law to his relations (1980, 139-40).

OIL AND AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT:
TANGIBLE FACTORS IN THE DISTANCING PROCESS

Oil and American involvement were tangible factors in the ongoing
process, and contributed to the widening gulf between the Shah and the
bulk of the Iranian people.

Oil became the "fuel," in more ways than

one, for modernization and for the ensuing turmoil.

Oil revenues,
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particularly the price explosion of 1973-1974, exacerbated a host of
potential problems.
national economy;

Those included 1) absorption of oil money into the
and 2) increasing Western penetration (Pakravan in

Pullapilly 1980, 105-125;

Sullivan 1981;

Looney 1982).

influenced the conditions of social organization;

Those factors

because they changed

"inputs and outputs of energy, information and objects."
To illustrate, Western penetration relates directly to one of the
most toxic issues of the Iranian Revolution, namely, American influence
in Iran.

It occurred on several levels, the political, the economic,

and the socio-cultural. Throughout the rule of Shah Mohammed Reza
Pahlavi, the United States had played a central part in Iranian affairs.
During World War II, Washington became increasingly aware of the
strategic importance of Iran, and established an Embassy there in 1944.
In the context of a twenty-year program of U.S.

aid to Iran, an example

of what America could do "by an unselfish American policy", President
Roosevelt saw Iran as "experiential station....
of a clinic" for his war policies (qtd.

something in the nature

in Preece 1979, 15).

As noted

earlier, in 1953 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assisted in
reinstating the Pahlavi government by removing Mossadeq who had been
responsible for oil nationalization, and thus ended his brief time
(1952-1953) as Iranian head of state.

Supporters of the Shah and the

American administration had perceived him as too far left.

The removal

of Mossadeq ushered in a harsher dictatorship under the Shah which
included the establishment of SAVAK in 1957, and the bloody
counter-revolution in the face of religious uprising in 1963.
Paradoxically, even the ulama had welcomed the Shah back in 1953,
considering him the lesser of two evils over the leftist-oriented
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government of Mossadeq.

Then, against this backdrop of violence and

massive demonstrations in Iran that landed Khomeini in exile, Kennedy
congratulated the Shah on his White Revolution.

Johnson praised him on

his "progress" in Iran that evolved "without violence, and without any
bloodshed" (Pahlavi 1980, 102).

In 1970, the ulama's reaction against a

meeting of thirty American investors in Tehran led to confrontations
with the regime.

The clergy saw expansion of American investment as a

"'catastrophe and an annihilating blow for the Iranian people.'"
Khomeini became reaffirmed as marja-i taqlid.

Students struck at Tehran

University and cried "’Long live Khumayni’" (qtd.
1972, 252).

in Algar in Keddie

Walking in the bazaar in Yazd in early 1971, Hoveyda

noticed a small poster announcing, "'The return of the [hidden] Imam is
at hand'" (Hoveyda 1975, 105).

Nixon visited the Shah in 1972 and

reassured him of American support.

Throughout, the United States

government encouraged the Shah to be a "strong leader."
Carter administration, however, the scenario changed.

During the
This change in

approach, as will be discussed later in the text, may well have pushed
adjustment processes in Iran, already at their limit, beyond their
capacity.
To another extent, the quantum jump in oil revenues created
problems of absorption into the economic development and growth process.
Revenues stimulated hasty "upward revisions" of development plans with
dramatic increases in spending.

The "runaway cycle" invited increasing

corruption, galloping inflation, greater inequality in income, and
increasing dependence on the West to help resolve growing disparities
(Pakravan in Pullapilly 1980, 116;

Looney 1982, 5).

Oil revenues

soared from $3.9 billion in 1973 to $17.4 billion in 1974.

In August
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1974, the Shah announced that expenditures under the

Five-Year-Development Plan, begun only one year earlier, would double.
Projected government expenditures for 1973-1978 were $122.8
billion--with $98.2 billion (80 percent) derived from oil revenues
(Green 1982, 51-52).

The process beckoned thousands of foreign

"experts" into the country whose population had historically suffered
from "xenophobia."

By 1977, the number of Americans in Iran exceeded

42,000, up from 10,000 in 1973 (Stempel 1981, 74).

Most of them

received three to four times more pay than their Iranian counterparts,
with comparable educational background, for equal work and
responsibilites. Relations between Americans and Iranians tended to be
cool--partly because of the ignorance of Americans about Iranian customs
and traditions, and about the public image of the United States in Iran.
American companies paid exorbitant rents to house their employees who
arrived in large groups.

Consequently, many Iranians found themselves

at the bottom of the housing market, unable to compete financially
(Beeman in Keddie 1983, 204-5).

Some American military-equipment

companies had open-ended contracts with the government of Iran--and
given certain circumstances, American civilians might have become
"mercenaries in the structure of the Iranian armed forces" (Sullivan
1981).

While between 1961-70, for instance, industry had grown at an

annual rate of 13 percent;
(Green 1982, 21).

agriculture had grown barely 3 percent

Peasants, displaced by land reform, flocked to the

cities to share in the new "wealth."
culture shock.

There, they suffered from extreme

Confrontation with thousands of Westerners and their

vastly different culture intensified the feeling of rootlessness they
already experienced (Kissinger 1979, 1260;

Sullivan 1981, 140).

As
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Sullivan noted, in search of something familiar and reassuring they
found solace in the mosque--where they gathered on Fridays (Iranian
weekends are on Thursdays and Fridays). There they heard the sermons of
Ayatollah Khomeini, preached through tape recorders from his desert
retreat in Najaf.

This explained why the sermons all over the country

resembled each other (1981, 140).
Against this volatile background, according to Sullivan, the
Government of the United States, under President Carter, communicated
inconsistently and often incoherently with the Shah, either directly, or
through Sullivan.

Consecutive messages often contradicted each other.

There seemed to be no clear policy in relation to Iran.

Moreover, the

Shah received lectures on human rights and on the virtues of democratic
political process, crassly lacking in his country (Kissinger 1979, 1261;
Pahlavi 1980;

Jordan 1980).

On December 7, 1977, the Iranian Committee

for the Defense of Liberty and Human Rights came into existence,
following the request of the Carter Administration.

In reaction to it,

Khomeini charged on February 19, 1978, "In Commemoration of the First
Martyrs of the Revolution":

As for America, a signatory to the Declaration of
Human Rights, it imposed this Shah upon us, a worthy
successor to his father. During the period he has
ruled, this creature has transformed Iran into an
offcial colony of the U.S. What crimes he has
committed in service of his master (qtd. in
Khomeini 1981, 215)!
Relaxing his grip, in trying to respond and follow conflicting messages
from Washington, rendered the Shah even less responsive to growing
unrest at a time that required heightened vigilance.

Abrahamian noted
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four reasons why the experiment of relaxing police controls failed:

1)

because repression of the past twenty five years had destroyed all
grass-root organizations, labor unions, and independent professional
associations--there were no leaders left with whom the Shah could
negotiate in order to coordinate change of course;

2) "the sudden

change in course coincided with an equally sudden economic recession,"
producing mass unemployment and disillusionment;

3) demonstrations

shifted the arena of dialogue from the negotiating table into the
streets;

and 4) Khomeini continued his attacks against the contemporary

Yazid and rejected "any compromise with the 'devil' who had sold Islam
and Iran to foreigners and whose hands were 'seeped in innocent blood'"
(1982, 515-17).
At the same time, as Kissinger observed, the Shah maintained an
"almost naive faith in the United States."
an "unconditional ally."

He was a "rare leader" and

He exhibited "...extraordinary trust in

American purposes and American goodwill...

and disintegrated

psychologically when he sensed that friendship evaporating" (1979,
1261).

Michael Blumenthal, the American Secretary of Treasuryremarked

after returning from a trip to Iran in late 1978, "'He [the Shah] is not
functioning'" (qtd in Hoveyda 1980, 48).
Reflecting on the events of January 1979, a few days before the
Shah's departure from Iran, Sullivan offered this:

As far as I could see, the United States government
was facing the situation in Iran with no policy
whatsoever. The Shah's collapse in my judgement,
was inevitable, and unless some understandings are
reached for an accommodation between the armed
forces and the Islamic forces, I felt that an
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explosion would occur (1981, 225).
Apparently until then the Shah had assumed that the U.S.

administration

had some "grand national design that was intended to save his country...
and his dynasty."

He was, therefore:

... prepared to make personal sacrifices for the
larger goal. It now suddenly became clear to him,
as it had to me, that our government’s actions were
being guided by some inexplicable whim. It was a
bad day for both of us (Sullivan 1981, 226).
To Carter, however, American interests in Iran were not necessarily
tied to personal well-being of the Shah (Jordan 1982).

To an Iranian

people, at the brink of revolution, suffering from severe identity
crises and chronic xenophobia, with an expressed and growing hatred of
the United States --American influence may well have served as final the
blow.

Under these circumstances, the relationship represented the

ultimate aloofness, unresponsiveness and insult of the regime toward the
majority of the Iranian people.

KHOMEINI--THE "PRINCE" WHO LEGITIMATES HIS OWN THREAT SYSTEM
THE IMAM IN THE LINE OF ALI--THE CHARISMATIC LEADER--THE HERO

From Neauphle-le-Chateau in France, "Imam" Khomeini issued another
declaration one week before the beginning of Muharram (November 23,
1978) . It advanced the confrontation between the regime of the Shah,
and the Iranian people "to a point of no return" (Algar in Khomeini
1981, 242).

Using the Karbala symbolism, Khomeini asked for heroism and

self-sacrifice to defeat "satanic governments," and "tyrants of history"
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with clenched fists, "just as the leader of Muslims had taught."

He

encouraged "those well informed about the state of the country to draw
up lists of ministers serving this usurpatory government, or traitors
and officers who are ordering crimes and massacres throughout the
country, so that people will know what to do with them at the
appropriate time" (In Khomeini 1981, 242-43).

He addressed students,

journalists, workers and peasants, bazaar merchants and tradesmen and
"all classes of the population," including "proud nomadic tribes" and
"deprived slum dwellers" to advance together "with a single voice and a
single purpose, to the sacred aim of Islam--the abolition of the cruel
Pahlavi dynasty, the destruction of the abominable monarchical regime,
and the establishment of an Islamic republic based on the progressive
dictates of Islam.
Khomeini 1981, 244)!

Victory is yours, nation arisen in revolt" (In
Khomeini ended his declaration in this way:

The history of Iran is witnessing today the most
sensitive days that Islam and our dear Muslims have
experienced. Today, great nation, you have come to
a fork in the road: one way leads to eternal
dignity and splendor, and the other (God forbid), to
perpetual humiliation and degradation.... There is
no excuse for any class of people in the nation to
remain inactive today; silence and apathy mean
suicide, or even aid to the tyrannical regime....I
extend a hand of affection and devotion to the noble
people of Iran, who, with power they derive from
Islam, have given a heavy punch in the mouth to the
Shah and his supporters. The martyrs Iran has
offered, for the sake of justice and divine aims, I
regard with eternal pride.... Noble nation, you
have alerted the noble young people of other Islamic
nations, and we hope that your powerful hand will
raise up the proud banner of Islam in all regions.
This is my petition to God, the Exalted (qtd. in
Khomeini 1981, 245).
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In the process, Khomeini became the charismatic leader of the
Iranian people.

According to Shariati, an Iranian sociologist, this

term equates with Imam.

That is, the revolutionary movement has

reinterpreted the term Imam to mean "charismatic figure who arises out
of the people and expresses the general will" (Fischer 1980, 6).
Accordingly, Khomeini became the "symbolic leader of the revolution"
(Fischer 1980, 6).

While never directly rejecting the title Imam,

Khomeini carefully captioned his official portraits with Nayib al-Imam
(Aide to Imam) (Fischer 1980, 6).
line of Ali.

He is thus assured legitimacy in the

In its classic Weberian formulation, legitimacy involves

transformation of naked power into authority which is generally accepted
and obeyed without frequent resort to coercion (Dekmejian in Curtis
1981, 33).

It is based on the promise that compatible values will be

pursued.
Upon his return to Iran, Khomeini spoke at Bihisht-i Zahra Cemetary
in South Tehran, to commemorate the seventeenth of Sharivar (Black
Friday) at the place where the martyrs of the revolution are buried.
spoke on February 2, 1979, at Lot Number 17.
"illustrative of his power."

He

His address was

Though it expressed emotions, he "used

none of the rhetorical cues for weeping, and no one wept."

Although the

situation lent itself beautifully to a rawzeh--the form of his speech
was no rawzeh--it was different.

"People listened intently and

applauded once" when he anounced the Islamic government would soon be
instituted (Fischer 1980, 214).

He further asserted this:
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The rule of Muhammed Riza then, is illegal, first,
because the rule of his father was also illegal, and
the Constituent Assembly was convened in his time at
bayonet-point; second, if we suppose the rule of
Riza Shah to have been legal, those who put him in
power had no right to determine our destiny.... In
any event, even if the foundation of the Pahlavi
monarchy had been legitimate and the Constituent
Assembly were functioning legally at the time, our
people are declaring today that they do not now want
this ruler. They are, in effect, voting against
Muhammad Riza and the monarchical form of
government, which is their right. The institution
is therefore invalid (Khomeini 1981, 255-56).
Hussein had finally beaten Yazid.

The observation of one believer who

had discovered his "Islamic Identity" may sum up what had transpired.
Participating in one of the demonstration marches he was moved to
remark, "'there was no longer an I but only a We'" (qtd in Arani 1980,
12).

THE SHAH FROM EXILE:

DISTANCE EXEMPLIFIED THROUGH HIS VIEWS

The tables had turned, the Shah, in exile seemed uncomprehending.
He offered this:

Of course, I continue to focus on events in my
homeland, past and present. Certainly, I had made
mistakes in Iran. However, I cannot believe they
formed the basis for my downfall. They were
rectifiable in time. My country stood on the verge
of becoming a great civilization. The forces
against me, however, proved stronger, although they
were gathered without unified motive or larger
purpose (Pahlavi 1980, 34).
His vision of the future for his country in no way seemed to coincide
with that of the mass of his people.

The distance between them had been
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too great for him to really see and to really understand.

Neither

negotiations nor compromises had been possible across this gulf.
result was alienation and disintegration.
others to be different.

The

Paradoxically, he expected

For instance, he expressed anger over the

ignorance he perceived of the West in relation to Iran.

In the same

breath he showed his own ignorance about his country and people. He
charged:

Much of the opposition aroused in the West seems to
have been triggered by ignorance, and a warped view
of what Iran should be.... I have never understood
British and American inability to recognize Iran as
a truly independent nation.... Part of the answer,
I think, lies in the West's lack of interest in
Iran's history and its failure to understand the
difference between Persia, both ancient and modern,
and itself. My own answer to history, therefore,
must begin with the history of my country, the 3000
years of Persian civilization that, misunderstood,
has led to the defeat of Iran's attempt to enter the
twentieth century, perhaps presaging an even greater
defeat of the countries I considered friends and
allies (Pahlavi 1980, 34).

CONCLUSION

Without divine favor my revolution would not have
been possible. Without God's support I would be a
man like all the rest. And divine assistance will
guarantee the continuation of our work (Shah
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi qtd. in Hoveyda 1980,
122-23).
From the religious point of view I am entitled to
act as I do... When I saw the scale of movement, I
saw God in it. That cannot be the work of a man
(Ayatollah Khomeini qtd. in Hoveyda 1980, 121).
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Both, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and Ayatollah Rohullah Khomeini
considered themselves to be defending the core of their civilization
against corruption and destruction (Beeman in Keddie 1983, 197-98).
each the core of civilization differed greatly.

For

For the Shah, it was a

Persia, ancient and great, rapidly adapting to modern ways, to become a
leader of the world.

For the Imam, it was a nation rooted in the

millenium-old vision of a Golden Age in Islam, prevented by a usurper
who had to be destroyed.

Thus, the ensuing struggle involved more than

abstract definitions of a valid core.

Rather, for many Iranians it

pivoted on a real, central feature of their existence.
In inheriting a dictatorship from his father, and thus a threat
system, the Shah had also inherited distance, as defined by Boulding,
separating him from the citizens of Iran.
two-way communication.
become impossible.

Distance prevents effective

Dialogue, mutual understanding, and nurturance

Erosion of support and alienation follow.

Across

the gulf, the Shah imposed rapid modernization on Iran, insensitive to
the needs, opinions and sentiments of many Iranians, and insensitive to
the integrative and exchange systems, intertwined in a complex way.

To

deter subsequent opposition, the Shah used force in the form of his
military establishment, and later of SAVAK, thus concretizing and
amplifying the threat system.

In the absence of nurturance and of any

kind of free expression, suppressing Shi'ism, the integrative system, he
substituted force in an effort to hold "things together."

In addition,

the Shah tried to inject charisma and facilitate social cohesion through
numerous splendid affairs, and by trying to project a father image.
celebrations, however, only managed to widen the gulf.

The

For one, because

in their context, the Shah insulted believers by asserting pre-islamic,
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pagan roots.

For another, because he repelled many intellectuals and

others with his display of wealth and conspicuous consumption in the
face of poverty in many areas of Iran.

As father to the nation,

moreover, he became perceived as tyrannical and oppressive, rather than
understanding and caring.
The issue of legitimate leadership as central theme of Shi'i Islam,
placed the Shah on tenuous ground from the beginning of his rule. In
the context of instability, consistent with any threat system, this
issue took on eschatological dimensions.

That is to say, the Shah might

have survived in power longer, had his view of the world and subsequent
course of action not been perceived by the Shi'a as threatening Islam
itself, and thus, their very existence.

At least, this is what the

voice of the Iranian Shi’a, Khomeini, asserted.
Iran, but Islam itself to be in danger.

He perceived not only

He used the issue of legitimate

rule by the Imam in the line of Ali, as argument to overthrow the
oppressive, usurpatory government--as he manipulated symbols, beliefs,
and rituals of Shi'i Islam.

His challenges and threats escalated in

intensity, consistent with the Iranians escalating threat of "being at
issue."

In that sense, his declarations became the barometer for the

level of stress and anxiety present in Iranian society.

In the process,

Khomeini became the charismatic leader for the majority of Iranians.

He

led the revitalization movement which reduced the stress level in the
system, by simplifying the repertoire, and by serving as unifying,
organizing, integrating principle in opposition to the regime.

He

became the "prince" who legitimated his own threat system in the name of
Islam.

Shi'ism, therefore, became the equilibrating force in an anomic

environment, historically rooted in instability, and contemporarily
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subjected to rapid change, oppression and corruption.

Shi'ism served as

integrative system with the promise of safety and justice.

As in the

early days of Islam, the belief system constricted to serve a boundary
maintaining function, in the absence of a well-defined, concrete
boundary of the state.

Khomeini presided over the "closing of the

system."
Intellectuals and other groups joined believers in following
Khomeini because he seemed to offer the only avenue from oppression,
non-participation, corruption, overconsumption and disintegration.

In

contrast to the image of the United States and of the Shah, as corrupt,
inconsistent, wasteful and sinful--Khomeini appeared incorruptible,
consistent and dynamic.

He led a simple life, and refused to compromise

with satanic powers (Abrahamian 1982, 531-2).

In this sense, Shi'ism

became the apparent contemporary solution for many Iranians.

It

promised to transform Iranian society into a "just social system."
Iranians perceived the United States as having played a central
part in the demise of Iran, and in having propagated a puppet, the Shah.
America became the "great Satan" and the Shah the "Yazid of the Age."
Because villain images embody anxiety in personal form, America and the
Shah became the focus for hostility.

They also served the functions of

sustaining moral vigilance, preparing for the affirmative entrance of a
hero, and reminding the faithful of "what kinds of people are to be
feared."

Khomeini became the Imam.

At the core of these dynamics lie centuries of religious tradition
of secrecy, martyrdom and revolt--where "'dying power'" by far outweighs
"'killing power.'" Dying power "'constitutes the strength of social
movements,'" and "'changes the world'" (Hoveyda 1980, 107).
preferable to disintegration.

Dying is
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Let no man say that I have said nothing new--the
arrangement of the material is new. In playing
tennis, we both use the same ball, but one of us
places it better. I would just as soon be told that
I have used old terms. Just as the same thoughts
differently arranged form a different discourse, so
the same words, differently arranged form different
thoughts (Pascal 1950, 358).
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APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY

Abbasids:

the caliphs who ruled the Islamic community from

750-1258 A.D. from their capital, Baghdad,
alim (singular of ulama): learned man.
aql:

the reasoning of interpretation given by a mujtahid.

awqaf (plural of waqf):
ayatollah:

religious endowments.

'sign of God'--an honorific title given to leading

Shi'ite mutj tahids.
caliph:

successor to Muhammad as leader of the Muslim community,

(Arabic Khalifa:

successor).

The four 'orthodox' or 'rightly guided' caliphs, according to the
Sunnis, are Abu-Bakr (623-4), Umar (634-44), Uthman (644-56) and
Ali (656-61).

For the Shi'a the first three are usurpers, and Ali

was Muhammad's directly designated successor,
faqih:

jurist, expert in divine law.

fatwa:

official ruling on a point of Islamic law.

fifth plan:

Iran's development plans were of varying lengths.

were as follows:

First Development Plan 1948-1955;

They

Second Develop

ment Plan 1955-1962; Third Development Plan 1962-1968; Fourth
Development Plan 1968-1973; Fifth Development Plan 1973-1978.
Fida iyan-i Islam:

a militant fundamentalist organization

established in 1945 with the aim of restoring the pure Islam of the
Prophet.
fiq:

Islamic jurisprudence.
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hadith:

sayings attributed to Prophet Muhammad.

hawza:
ijma:

circle, a mode in which education takes place at the madrasah,
the opinions commonly agreed upon by the imams,

ijtihad:

the use of independent judgement in interpreting Islamic

law.
imam:

one of 12 descendents of the Prophet through his cousin Ali,

the first in the line.

As "'proofs of God,'" designated by God as

spiritual authorities, their oustanding qualities are supposed to
enable them to "transmit God's light to believers."
Imam:

the messiah.

His advent will inaugurate the age of justice

in the world,
imamat:

the institution of the rule of the imams.

Islam: "submission to the will

of God."

ismat: chastity, a quality attributed to
Ithna' Ashariyah:

the imams.

"twelvers," a Shi'i sect, dominant in Iran,

believed that the line of imams extended to 12.

The last imam will

return to this world as Mahdi, and establish justice,
jihad:

a holy war conducted on behalf of the Islamic community,

kadkhuda:

"little god";

the village headmen, and/or agent of

the landlord in rural society, or the leader of a tribal clan,
khums: "one-fifth," the amount of income

tax Muslims are expected to

contribute to the mujtahids.
Koran (Qur'an):

the Word of God, as revealed to, and communicated by,

Muhammad.
madrasa:

the traditional theological seminary of Islam for the

training of religious teachers.
levels, namely:

Scholarly hierarchy consists of six

entry level, talib ilm or"learner";

second level,
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mujtahid or "someone who has exerted himself so as to be able and
frame an opinion";
the message";

third level, mubelleg al-risala or "carrier of

fourth level, hojat al-Islam or "authority of

Islam" (at this level the student has his own hawza); fifth level,
ayatollah or "sign of God";

sixth level, ayatollah al-uzma or

"great sign of God". There can only be five of the last category
at any one time.

Anyone at this level personifies the "individual

to be referred to on everything," immune to arrest even under the
Shah.

Khomeini belongs in this group.

Mahdi:

"the rightly guided one," the messiah, for the 'twelvers,'

the 12th Imam.

His return will inaugurate the age of justice in this

world.
Majlis:
milk:

the Iranian parliament;

a council, assembly,

private property.

Muharram:

religious month of mourning.

mujtahid:

one who is qualified to exercise ijtihad, or interpretive

reason, to clarify the intent of Islamic law.
mulla:

a lower-ranking member of the ulama, that is, a clergy man,

preacher, used to be the term for one who was literate, generic term
for clergy man.
mumin:
muslim:

believer, one who has religious faith,
submitter.

Nayib al-Imam:

Aide to Imam. (It is how Khomeini captions his official

portraits--the revolutionaries of 1977-1979, however, call him Imam.)
Pahlavi:

the dynasty ruling Iran from 1925-1979.

Qajar:

the dynasty ruling Iran from 1785-1925.

rawda:

preachment, homilistic sermon.
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Safavids: the Safavi dynasty, ruling Iran from 1501-1722.

sayyid:

direct descendent of the prophet, entitled to wear a green or

black turban.
shaykh:

a wise leader, an elder.

Shaykh al-Islam:

an official appointed by the Shah, from the ranks

of the clergy, to serve in each of the major cities of Iran.
shari'a:

the law of Islam, therefore, the divine law.

shar': canon law, religious courts.
Shi1a (Shi’ite):

the sects in Islam which view Ali, Muhammed's son-in-

law and cousin, as his rightful successor, and his line as legitimate
leadership of the world Muslim community.
Shi'i: of the Shi'ah.
Sufism:

a mystical counterculture and religious tradition found

throughout the Muslim world.
Sunna:

the 'beaten path,' the traditions of the prophet's practices

and behavior, also those who believe in the legitimacy of the
caliphate of Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman, and the rule of the Umayyad
dynas ty.
Sunni:

of the orthodox branch of Islam, who consider themselves

followers of the authentic Sunna--as opposed to the Shi'a, for
example.
talib:
taqiyya:

religious student.
the principle of dissimulation of belief for the purpose of

protecting the shi'i community from annihilation.
taqlid:

following one more learned than oneself, imitating a religious

authority.
taqut:

term from the Koran with emotive force, denotes tyrannical
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earthly power and omnipotence that belongs to God alone, used by
Khomeini in reference to the Shah.
ulama:

religious leaders, learned men, scholars of Islam.

Umayyads: the dynasty with its seat in Damascus, that controlled the
caliphate from 661-750 A. D..
umma:

the religious community, followers of the prophet.

’urf:

customary law.

usul: the principles of Islamic legal authority.
valayat:

allegiance to the rule of the imams, their rule, based on

their ability to interpret the holy law, particularly its esoteric
meaning.
waqf:

permanent endowment or trust.

White Revolution:

Promulgated in 1963, it first included six steps,

and was later increased by 11 more.
follows:

The complete 17 steps were as

1.land reform 2.nationalization of forests and pastures

3.public sale of state-owned factory shares as security for land
reform 4.profit sharing in industry 5.reform of electoral law
6.creation of a Literacy Corps 7.creation of the Health Corps (1964)
8.creation of the Reconstruction and Development Corps (1964)
9.creation of Houses of Equity (1965) 10.nationalization of water
resources (1967) 11.call for urban and rural reconstruction (1967)
12. call for administrative and educational reforms (1967)

13.call

for expansion of ownership in industry (1975) 14.equitable pricing
and antiprofiteering campaign (1975) 15.free education and free meals
for primary school children (1975) 16.free nutrition for pregnant
women and infants (1975) 17.national social security (1975).
zakat:

the poor-rate prescribed by the Koran.

It is for the support

96

of widows and orphans, and is levied annually on the capital of
believers.
zulm:

oppression, hurt.^

A NOTE ON SPELLING
Because of variations in transliteration among the sources
used for this thesis, some Persian or Arabic words may be
spelled differently within the text, particularly in direct
quotes.

For the same reason, they may also differ slightly from

their spelling in the glossary.
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APPENDIX B

CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT HISTORICAL EVENTS
Pre-Medean
ca. 6000-2000 B.C. ------

Settled agriculture among indigenous
peoples; brick dwellings; pottery;
major settlements at Susa, Tepe
Hisar, Sialk, Tepe Gujan, Zuriyeh,

ca. 1500 B.C. ----------

Migratory invasions into region by
Medes, Scythians, and Parsua (Persians)

Medean Empire (614 B.C.) --

Medean chief, Cyaxeres (Uvakhstra),
captured and leveled Assyrian capital,
Nineveh; expansion of area under
Medean control; the Parsua became
vassals of Medes

Achaemenids (550-330 B.C.) -

Cambyses I, son of Cyrus I, married
a daughter of Medean king; their
son, Cyrus II, subjugated Medes and
then established a world empire;
Zoroastrianism became most important
religion

Cyrus II (559-529 B.C.) --

Capture of Babylon in 539 B.C.; empire
extended east to Hindu Kush

Cambyses II (529-522 B.C.)-

Invaded and captured Egypt, Palestine,
Syria, and parts of Asia Minor
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Darius I (522-486 B.C.) ---

Crushed Egyptian revolt; Battle of
Marathon in 490 B.C.; retreat of
empire to Asia Minor

Xerxes (486-465 B.C.) ....

Period of military defeats in west

465-330 B.C. ............

Disintegration of Achaemenid power;
last ruler in dynasty killed by his
subj ects

Greek Occupation
331-323 B.C. --

Alexander the Great invaded and con
quered region;

Hellenistic culture

amalgamated with indigenous culture
311-150 B.C. --

Descendants of Alexander's general,
Seleucus, sought to maintain geogra
phical integrity of empire in face
local rebellions and foreign incur
sions

Parthian Empire
(129 B.C.-A.D. 226)

Parthian Arsacids expanded and even
tually overcame Seleucids;

assimi

lation of Greek governmental prac
tices;

old Persian title king of

kings restored;

country organized

on feudal basis with vassal princes
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Sassanian Empire
(A.D. 226-641)

First native dynasty since Achaemenids
and was patterned after them;

king

relied on Zorostrian clergy and nobi
lity to operate highly centralized
government;

entrenched class system

Islamic Conquest
ca. 642-ca. 800

Arab Muslim armies overcame and easily
conquered region, which falls under
rule of Arab caliphates;

by ca. 800

bulk of inhabitants converted to Islam;
country divided into provinces headed
by military governors;

most

administrators Iranians
ca. 800-ca. 1050

Rise of minor and localized dynasties;
Iranian nationalism expressed in grow
ing adherence to Shiite (Shia) Islam;
literature expressed pre-Islamic themes
and language

Seljuq Empire
(1037-1157)

Seljuq Turks conquered local kingdoms,
incorporating them into Seljuq Empire;
Seljuqs sought to reassert Sunni Islam;
rise of the "Assasins," an Ismaili group
committed to political resistance to
Seljuq, Sunni rule
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Mongol Invasions ........

In 1220 armies of Genghis Khan invaded
and devastated much of Iran

Ilkhanid Dynasty ------(1256-ca. 1375)

Successors of Mongol invaders converted
to Islam and adopted Iranian culture;
excellent administration and extensive
patronage of the arts

Timurid Dynasty ........
(ca. 1375-1499)

Central-Asian Turkic-speaking people led
by Timur (Tamerlane) wrest control of
Iran from Ilkhanids, whose administra
tive procedures were retained;

flou

rishing of arts and sciences, period of
famous poet Hafiz

Safavid Dynasty (1502-1736)

First native dynasty in eight centuries;
traced its line to Seventh Shia Imam.
Shia Islam proclaimed state religion;
shah had virtually absolute rule;
period of intense nationalism

Shah Abbas (1587-1628) --

Opened Iran to west;
to Dutch and British;
state expense;

granted concessions
public works at

consolidation of power

of the monarchy

Afshar Dynasty (1736-50) --

Nadir Shah, tribesman from north the and
military genius, proclaimed himself
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shah;

numerous forays into India;

overtaxation of land; poor administra
tion

Zand Dynasty (1750-94) ---

Muhammad Karim Khan Zand established
dynasty with capital in Shiraz;
many social and community improvements;
struggle for supremacy among Turkish
tribes

Qajar Dynasty (1796-1925) - Turkish Qajar tribe established itself
as central power;

landlords acquired

greater power
Fath Ali Shah
(1797-1834)

Army ill equipped;

by Treaty of

Gulistan, Georgia ceded to Czarist
Russia;

intense rivalry between

Russia and Great Britain for Iranian
interests
Nasir al Din Shah
(1848-96)

Sought to create modern army; commer
cial concessions made to British to
increase holdings of treasury;

public

agitation against foreign influence
1905-06

Shah forced to proclaim constitution
and establish an elective assembly

1907

Iran divided into spheres of influence
by Russia and Great Britain
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1908-11 -------- ----- Shah's counterconstitutional coup over
turned by tribal forces
1914-17-------- -------

Iran declared itself neutral in World
War I and was then occupied by Russian
and British troops; central government
emasculated

1921-1945 --------------

Coup d'etat led by Reza Khan;
rebellions suppressed;

tribal

1924 end of

Qajar Dynasty

Pahlavi Dynasty (1925-1979)

Reza Khan founded Pahlavi dynasty and
instituted numerous westernizing re
forms;

oil royalties used to finance

development
1 9 4 1 ------

-.......

Iran declared itself neutral in 1939;
British, Russian, and American troops
invaded and occupied Iran;

Reza Shah

abdicated in favor of his son, Mohammad
Reza Pahlavi, who succeeded to throne
1951-53 ................

Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq natio
nalized oil industry, which provoked
boycott by European powers;
ousted;

Mossadeq

return of shah to position of

central authority
1959-1962 --------------

Land reform bill of 1959, ratified in
1960, an effort to proportion land more
fairly among the population;

the bill
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evoked intense opposition from Khomeini,
and other religious leaders, and there
fore, remained inoperative;

the cabinet

approved a new version in 1962
1963 ..

Proclamation by shah of White Revolution
(Shah-People Revolution); demonstrations
resulted;

Khomeini declared the end to

taqiyya (dissimulation); he was arrested
on June 4, and released to Qum, the "holy
city," after two months.

On June 5, a

"day of infamy," massive demonstrations
occurred, "thousands died"
1964 -------------------

Khomeini exiled to Turkey on November 4

1965 ...................

Majlis conferred title Arymehr (Light of
The Aryans) on shah;

Khomeini went into

exile in Najaf, Iraq, from Turkey
1967 -------------------

Formal coronation of Shah and Shahbanou;
Reza Cyrus, their eldest son, named crown
prince

1 9 7 1 ..................

Persepolis ceremony to celebrate the
2500th anniversary of the monarchy,
attended by hundreds of foreign heads of
state; shah reasserts pre-Islamic, Aryan
roots

1973-1974 --------------

Shah announced Five-Year-Development-Plan
in 1973, in August 1974 he doubled pro
jected expenditures under the plan.
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1975 -...... ...... ....

On March 2 the shah announced the estab
lishment of a single party system in
Iran, the Rastakhiz party

1977 -------------------

The shah altered the calendar to start not
with Hijra (Muslim calendar) but with the
foundation of the pre-Muslim, Persian
Empire by Cyrus the Great;

seen as "the

last straw" by many Shi’is of Iran;
1979 --------- ---------

January 16, the reign of Mohammad Reza
Pahlavi ended when he was forced from
the throne by Khomeini;
country;

he left the

on February 1, Khomeini

returned to Iran.

13
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APPENDIX C

COUNTRY PROFILE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION

Country
Formal Name:
Short Form:

Empire of Iran
Iran

Term for Citizens: Iranian
Capital:

Tehran

Georgraphy
Size:

Land area of about 636,000 square miles;

sovereignty claimed

over territorial waters up to twelve nautical miles.
Topography:

Large central plateau surrounded on three sides by

rugged mountain ranges.

Highest peak is Mount Damavand, about

18,000 feet above sea level.
Climate:

Annual rainfall amounts to about fifty inches in the

mountains of the west and southwest, heaviest concentrations between
December and March;
inches.

in the Central Plateau desert, less than two

Temperatures range from -18°F in the mountainous

northwest to 132°F in parts of the desert.

In the northwest,

winters often exeed six months, summers are mild and short.
In the desert, temperatures drop to freezing in winter--summers are
hot and long--some areas may experience no rain for years.
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Society
Population:

Estimated at over 34 million in mid-1977, growing

annually at a rate of 2.7 percent.

Population nearly evenly

divided between urban and rural, less than 5 percent are nomads
and seminomads.
Education and Literacy:

Education basically free up to secondary

levels; at higher levels, financial assistance is available.
Enrollments doubled between 1963 and 1973.
through the late 1970s.

Expansion continued

Literacy estimated at 37 percent

despite efforts and growth of Literacy Corps.
universities, both local and abroad.

in 1977,

Students flock to

In 1977 an estimated 60,000

Iranians studied abroad, the majority in the United States.
Health:

Infant diseases, gastrointestinal diseases, diseases of the

respiratory system, and parasitic diseases are reported as major
causes of mortality.

In spite of growing medical services in the

mid 1970s, with 12,000 doctors in practice, an additional 22,000
doctors are needed.
Languages:

The official language is Farsi (known as Persian

outside Iran), spoken by over half of the population, and a second
language for the majority of the remainder.

Other important

languages are Turkic, Kurdish, and Arabic.
Ethnic Groups:
group.

At 63 percent

Persians are the largest ethnic

In addition, Kurds, Azarbaijanis, Lurs, Baktiars,

Qashqais, Baluchi, and Arabs are important groups.
Religion:

Shi'i Islam is the official state religion--

approximately 90 percent

of the population are Shi'i Muslims.

Other religious groups are Sunni Muslims, Jews, Armenian
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Christians, Assyrians Christians, Bahais, and Zoroastrians.

Government and Politics
Governmental Structure:

Constitutional monarchy and highly

centralized unitary state.

Shahanshah Moahmmad Reza Pahlavi makes

the major decisions in affairs of state.

He ascended to the throne

in 1941, and is the head of state, and the de facto head of
government.

At the same time, the prime minister, appointed by

the Shah to chair the cabinet of ministers, technically holds that
position.

The system of government is based on the Constitution of

1906 and 1907, and consists of the executive, bicameral legislature
(the lower house Majlis and Senate), and the judiciary branches.
Politics:

Since March 1975, Iran has a one-party system under

the Iran National Resurgence Party (the Rastakhiz-e-Mellat-e-Iran
or, the Rastakhiz Party).

The party serves as political tool of

the system, centered on the Shah, and reaffirms these three major
principles:

the unquestionable supremacy of the monarchy, the

Constitution, and the Shah-People or White Revolution.

(See

Glossary). In 1977 political and governmental policies and
actions remain committed to the course set forth in 1963, in
an effort to achieve the goals of national modernization under
the programs of the White Revolution. The armed forces are the
most important power base for the Shah.

Political opposition

seems minor, yet vocal, and potentially volatile, particularly
if diverse groups, such as the intellectuals, the college
students, and some religious leaders find a common organizational
focus.

The Shah's secret police, the National Intelligence and
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Security Organization (Sazeman Ettelaat va Amniyat Kashvar-SAVAX) is omnipresent, reducing the possibility of organized
dissidence.
Administrative Divisions:

Iran is divided into three provinces

(ostans), each under a governor general (ostanddar). Each province
is subdivided into districts (sharestans), each under a governor
(farmandar). Districts are again divided into subdistricts
(bakhsh), under lieutenant governors (bakhsdar), and into cities
and towns.

Subdistricts are parceled into countries or

townships (dehistans), under sherriffs (dehdar), and then into
villages (deh), under village headmen (kadkhudas-see Glossary).
All local heads, except for the village headmen, are appointed,
and answer to the central Ministry of Interior.
Judicial System:

It consists of the following arms--the Supreme

Court or Court of Cassation, the courts of appeal or high courts,
the houses of equity for rural areas, and the councils of
arbitration for cities.

In addition, military courts play an

integral part, with jurisdiction loosely defined in relation to
political crimes.
International Affairs:

Allied with the West multilaterally

through the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and
bilaterally with the United States.

Increasingly emphasizing

importance of self-reliant defense capability, and independent
foreign policy posture.

Member of the United Nations (UN),

cultivating diplomatic relations with over 120 nations.
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Economy
Salient Features:

A developing country striving for an

industrial base and for self-sustaining growth.

Gross National

Product (GNP) in fiscal year 1976 was US$57.5 billion.
GNP per year capita in September 1977 was US$2,200. In the same
year, the economy of Iran ranked 15th in the
world.

noncommunist

GNP growth rate a year in fiscal years 1971-1974

was 29 percent in constant prices.

Iran has considerable

natural resources.
Oil Industry:

In 1976, Iran was the fourth largest producer

and the second largest exporter of oil in the world.

In the

same year, oil revenues amounted to about US$20 billion.
Without new finds, oil production is expected to decline in
the 1980s.
Industry:

Major source of employment in 1975, and accounted

for 18 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It had grown
rapidly since 1960, and included manufacturing, construction,
water, and power.

Manufacturing involved a wide range of

specialties, from handicraft carpets, to state of the art
technology in processing steel and petrochemicals.
Agriculture:

Employed 30 percent of the workforce in 1975,

and accounted for 9 percent of the GDP.

Sector grew more slowly

in the 1970s than the population, attributed to scarce water
supplies, and to outdated farming practices.
be self-sufficient in grains by the 1980s.

Iran aims to
At the same time,

it will likely remain a large importer of food for many years.
Foreign Trade:

Trade predominantly with industrialized nations.
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In 1976,

exports US$15 billion--96 percent from oil;

imports

US$13 billion--52 percent intermediate goods, 30 percent machinery,
and 18 percent consumer goods.
International Finance:

Heavy foreign borrowing in 1976 and 1977

to support budget and development.
ment program.

Large foreign aid and invest

Some foreign corporations invested directly. Net

exporter of capital in 1974-75 fiscal year.
Currency:

Rial

Transportation and Communications
Roads:

In 1976 Iran had approximately 34,000 miles of roads,

including 12,000 miles of asphalt, 11,000 of surfaced feeder
roads, and 11,000 miles of cultivated earth.

Main areas connected

without sufficient feeder roads. Some areas lacked roads and
modern transport.
Railroads:

Approximately 2,700 miles of track with connections

to Turkey and to the Soviet Union.
Airports:

Additional tracks planned.

Eighteen major airports on 1976, two of those, Tehran

and Abadan, were international.
Pipelines:

Approximately 5,100 miles in 1976--used for transport

of crude, petroleum products, and natural gas.
Communications:
East.

Most advanced telecommunications in the Middle

About 800,000 phones in 1976, falling far short of demand.

National Security
Armed Forces (1977):

Army--220,000; Navy--30,000; Air Force--

100,000, largely conscripted.

Ill

Combat Units and Major Equipment (1977):

Army--four infantry

divisions, three armored divisions, four independent brigades
one surface-to-air missile (SAM) battalion.

Army Aviation

Command--over 3,000 tanks, over 600 combat helicopters (some
of those still on order).

Navy--about 60 combat vessels,

such as destroyers, frigates, and hovercraft;
battalions;

naval air--40 aircraft.

three marine

Air Force--22 fighter

squadrons, one reconaissance squadron, three SAM battalions,
652 combat aircraft, including those on order.
Military Budget (1976):

US$9.5 billion, amounts to about

30 percent of government expenditures and to 17.4 percent
of GDP.
Police Agencies (1977):
Police--40,000;

Gendarmerie--75,000;

National

SAVAK--estimated 10,000.

Foreign Military Treaties:

Member of CENTO--and connected

with the United States through the following executive
agreement of 1959:

"...in case of aggression against Iran,

the...United States...will take such appropriate action,
including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually
^ upon...."
n14
agreed
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NOTES

^ Wallace 1966, explains this kind of process in terms of
"revitalization movements."

I will include his theoretical perspective

in my section called "Relationship to Theoretical Empirical Knowledge;"
Sunderland in Fischer 1968, 680, notes that "...

when many social rules

are simultaneously contravened, social difficulty and chaos ensue."
result may be disastrous "...

The

in all known instances there eventually

emerges a new social order."
2

Klapp 1978, 82-96, discusses some ways which facilitate and

signal that societies are stressed, and that "closing" of the system is
occurring."

For instance they use metaphors and images depicting

certain personalities or groups as villains, thus expressing internal
disorder or "entropy."
3
See Shils 1975, 258, on what constitutes this centrality.
He also elaborates on the relation between "charisma" and the need for
order, 261-263.
4

This section is primarily based on Watt 1961, 1980;

Hodgson 1974, I.

Other sources include Voll 1982.

The Muslim year is based in the lunar calender, containing
twelve months and 354 days.

The months are as follows:

Muharram,

Safar, Rabi I, Rabi II, Jumada I, Jumada II, Rajab, Sha'ban, Ramadan,
Shawwal, Dhu’l-Qa'da, Dhu'l-Hijja (Tritton 1951, 193).
There are five pillars of Islam, namely, the profession of
faith, prayer, alms, fasting, and pilgrimage;

the five persons of the

"ahl el-beit," namely, Mohammad, Fatima, Ali, Hassan and Husayn;
five daily prayers, and more (Heikal 1981, 83).

the
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^ Baraheni 1977, is one of the writers who survived
imprisonment and torture.

g

His book is an account of the experience.

Hooglund 1982, offers and extensive study on land reform in

Iran between 1960 and 1980.
9
The raid on the students at Fayziya Madrasa had been led by
Khosrodad who later became Commander of the Air Force under the Shah.
He was American trained.

During the revolution of 1977-1979, he was

among the first to be executed by the revolutionary tribunal.

Khomeini

refers to him as "vile individual" whose name he will mention at the
appropriate time (Khomeini 1981, 180).
^

The following section on Khomeini, including quotes from

his speeches, is taken primarily from Fischer in Esposito 1983, 154-58.
11- See Watt 1961, 14, on the connection of the Persian Empire
to Judaism.
12

The following served as sources for the Glossary:

Hanbook for Iran 1978, 477-479;
289-292;
13

Akhavi 1980, ix-xiii;

Area

Fischer 1980,

Mortimer 1982, 21-24.
Area Handbook for Iran 1978, xi-xiii, served a major

source for the Chronology of Important Historical Events.
14

The Country Profile was taken from Area Handbook for Iran

1978, xv-xix.
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